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Chapter 1
United States
Jeffrey H. Keefe and Rosemary Batt
The U.S. telecommunications industry is in turmoil as formerly separate
industries converge on the global information superhighway. As a multi-
media market place emerges, market boundaries are eroding among di-
verse information service suppliers that include the publishers of
newspapers, periodicals, and books; studios that produce movies and
television programs; video game makers and software developers; data
and information services; and burglar alarm and security firms. New
wireless and cable transmission technologies are changing the relative
economic and technical advantages among the common carriers in local
and long distance telephone services, cellular communications, broadcast
television and radio, and cable television. New digital technologies create
the potential for a myriad of interactive multimedia products as they si-
multaneously destroy the value of traditional telephone and television
transmission networks. State and federal regulatory regimes are being
dismantled to eliminate cross-subsidies in rate structures and to promote
innovation and market incentives, sometimes through competitive mar-
kets but more often through unregulated oligopoly, duopoly, and even'
monopoly market structures. In response to this changing environment,
telecommunications firms are restructuring, vertically and horizontally
integrating and disaggregating, allying with former competitors, compet-
ing with former allies, and vigorously lobbying and litigating for market
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advantage. For investors, uncertainty and risk have replaced stability and
guaranteed rates of return.
This chapter examines the tumultuous restructuring of the U.S. tele-
communications common carriers as they escape from rate and entry reg-
ulation and compete in traditionally monopoly markets. The first section
discusses changes in product markets and technology; the second, busi-
ness strategy and structure and union strategy; the third, labor-manage-
ment relations; and the fourth, work reorganization and internal labor
markets. In the first section, we argue that the chief cost advantages in
the long distance, local telephone, cable TV, and wireless telecommunica-
tions markets derive from the integration of their network systems. Net-
work integration can still generate substantial economies of scale and
scope that produce lower unit costs; and consumers prefer integrated ser-
vice delivery. While new technologies have a centralizing thrust, however,
the ultimate structure of the industry is uncertain, and depends also on
the outcomes of current political and economic battles over market de-
regulation and reregulation. In the second section, we discuss the busi-
ness strategies of major telecommunications companies which have led
them to restructure their organizations. They are consolidating and cen-
tralizing their network operations and customer service organizations to
achieve scale economies at the same time that they are developing seg-
mented marketing strategies. This organizational structure creates a basic
tension between productivity-enhancing centralization and market-
responsive decentralization.
These recent organizational and technical consolidations have resulted
in substantial employee displacement in an industry that formerly guar-
anteed employment security through carefully managed human resource
planning, which we analyze in the third section of this chapter. Since its
1984 divestiture, AT&T has eliminated nearly 150,000 union-repre-
sented jobs, accounting for 60 percent of its union-represented work
force. Between 1984 and 1992, the regional Bell companies reduced em-
ployment in their regulated telephone subsidiaries by 28 percent, elimi-
nating 158,281 jobs. As the deregulation of local telephone and cable
television services continues in the wake of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, the seven regional Bells and GTE have announced plans to eliminate
over 100,000 jobs, approximately 20 percent of local telephone service
employment, including the first layoffs at some of these companies since
the Great Depression. Downsizing has led to the demoralization of the
survivor work forces. In response, employment security has become the
major concern in collective bargaining, which remains relatively central-
ized.
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UNITED STATES 33
In the fourth section, we analyze more closely the ways in which com-
panies have reorganized work and the implications for internal labor
markets. Specifically, we argue that two competing approaches to work
reorganization have significantly changed the internal labor market rules
for managerial and nonmanagerial employees alike. The first approach
relies on employee participation and labor-management partnerships to
improve service quality through the redesign of jobs and human resource
practices. The logic of this approach is that employees will provide better
service if they have the opportunity to offer innovative solutions (em-
ployee participation), if they have the autonomy to meet customer needs
(job redesign), and if they have the appropriate skills (education and
training) and incentives (career opportunities, employment security, com-
pensation) to make a commitment to the company. This approach im-
plies that commitment is a two-way street: if the company shows its
commitment to enhancing employees' jobs and careers, then they in turn
will increase their efforts to make the company competitive. This ap-
proach has a decentralizing thrust because it relies on the talent and cre-
ativity of employees at the point of customer contact.
The second approach focuses on realizing scale economies and cutting
costs through consolidations, new applications of technology, reengin-
eering, and downsizing. It begins at the macro organizational level and
relies on top management, consultants, and engineers to develop system-
wide innovations. This approach relies on centralized decision making
rather than decentralized discretion. Because changes in the design of
jobs and human resource practices flow as a consequence of new technol-
ogies and organizational restructuring, companies do not make prior
commitments to job enhancement or employment security. The two ap-
proaches are, therefore, in conflict. As the statistics on widespread down-
sizing suggest, at AT&T and the regional Bell companies, the second
approach has dominated, and often undermined, the first. This turbulent
employment environment stands in sharp contrast to the stability that
most incu:i.nbent employees came to expect from their employers.
AT&TDivestiture, Deregulation, and Industrial
Restructuring
Throughout most of the twentieth century the telephone service industry
was regulated as a natural monopoly in a two-tiered federal and state
regulatory system. Under regulation, AT&T's Bell System achieved the
goal of universal telephone service for Americans before any other tele-
phone system in the world. Competition was largely repudiated as an
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effective public policy tool. Competition in an earlier period (1894-
1907) had produced an unnecessary duplication of telephone plant facili-
ties in urban areas and was thought to have slowed the diffusion of
telephone service by raising the cost of capital and by preventing the
realization of system economies, both of which allowed for lower prices
for basic service. Regulation rather than state ownership was a uniquely
American solution to the problems raised by competitive productive inef-
ficiencies or the natural monopoly problem.
Regulators sought to achieve efficiency, reliability, and universal ser-
vice. Efficiency was principally realized through network scale econo-
mies, the nonduplication of telephone facilities, regulatory review of
costs, and regulated pricing. Reliable high quality service was provided
through a highly integrated network and a service-oriented workforce
subject to regulatory review and sanction. Universal service was accom-
plished by subsidizing the price of basic telephone service and rate aver-
aging, which reduced the rates for residential and rural customers.
Under Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation,
AT&T functioned as the public network manager (Stone 1989). It pro-
vided all local companies access to the long distance network. The Com-
munications Act of 1934 required local operating companies to serve
everyone within their region. Federal and state regulators established a
fair and reasonable rate of return and prevented entry into the market.
Under this system 92 percent of American homes had telephones, and
most Americans were satisfied with their service.
Cross-Subsidy Problems and Strategic Entry
The cross-subsidies in the rate structure, however, made the Bell Sys-
tem vulnerable to competitive entry. Long distance service and business
equipment rental rates were deliberately set above their costs. The reve-
nue surpluses were used to reduce the price of basic telephone service
below its cost. This cross-subsidized rate structure, designed to promote
universal service, also created strong incentives for outside firms to devise
ways to enter the high-priced subsidy-generating markets. It also stimu-
lated large consumers of the high-priced services to seek alternative
sources of supply. Specifically, a concentrated group of large businesses
in financial and computer services increasingly subsidized local rates for
residential users. These large users became well organized into political
action groups that supported MCI's challenge to the Bell System's long
distance monopoly and blocked AT&T's efforts at Congressional reform
of the federal Communications Act.
During the post-World War II period, long distance rates increasingly
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cross-subsidized local service; this increasing subsidy was'largely dis-
guised by the rapid productivity gains in the long distance network. By
the mid-1970s, long distance rates paid for one-third of the local plant
costs, while long distance service accounted for less than 8 percent of
local plant usage; by 1980, long distance rates contributed two dollars to
the cross-subsidy for each dollar it cost to operate the long distance net-
work. Largely as a result of the subsidy, the inflation-adjusted average
monthly local telephone bill fell by 29 percent during the 1970s (Teske
1990). At the same time, the increasing subsidies stiffened the resolve
of major corporate long distance users to escape from the Bell System
monopoly and the cross-subsidized rate structure.
Over the objections of the FCC and AT&T, Mcr gained entry to the
publicly switched long distance market through a federal court ruling in
1978. Once MCI entered this market, the cross-subsidy rate structure
was doomed. Between 1982 and 1992, as the cross-subsidies were elimi-
nated, prices for long distance telephone service declined by 40 percent
and long distance calling volume more than doubled, while basic local
residential service rates increased by more than 60 percent from $11.58
to $18.66.1 Deregulation led to substantial economic gains for concen-
trated large corporate interests that are major users of the long distance
network and widespread losses for residential consumers and former Bell
System employees (Teske 1990). Not surprisingly, public opinion polls at
the time of AT&T divestiture indicated that over 70 percent of telephone
customers opposed the Bell System breakup.
The AT&T divestiture and telephone deregulation eliminated cross-
subsidies in long distance and telecommunications markets, while it is
eroding the cross-subsidized rate structure in local service. Consequently,
the principal beneficiaries of deregulation have been large corporate tele-
phone consumers. The elimination of the progressive cross-subsidization
of telephone service has redistributed income away from residential con-
sumers to large corporations. Residential consumers pay relatively more
for their telephone service than they would have under regulation; how-
ever, telephone rates continue to increase at a rate considerably below
the rate of inflation. In the period 1982 to 1992 the average annual price
increase in telephone service was 2.6 percent-considerably below the
4.7 percent average annual rate of increase for the Consumer Price Index
(FCC 1994, table 8.2, p. 302).
1. However, telephone service has expanded to 93.8% of U.S. households and remains
relatively fixed at 2 % of consumer expenditures.
J6 JEFFREY H. KEEFEand ROSEMARY BATT
The Integrated System of Telecommunications Services Production
The production of telecommunications is inherently systemic in na-
ture. The more participants in the telecommunication system, the more
communications opportunities are afforded any participant. By provid-
ing universal communications services, a telecommunications network
greatly enhances its value to all subscribers. However, to build such a
network requires considerable technological integration and compatibil-
ity among all its elements (Rosenberg 1994). Each service innovation
only becomes feasible when it can be technically integrated into the exist-
ing network in an economical way.
By continuously achieving new economies of system, the telecommuni-
cations services industry has led all service industries in productivity
growth in the post-World War II period. During the Bell System era,
between 1950 and 1984, labor productivity growth in telecommunica-
tions services averaged 6 percent annually, and during the last decade of
the Bell System the annual rate of productivity growth rose to 6.9 per-
cent. Pre-divestiture econometric studies consistently demonstrated over-
all economies of scale in the network, specific output economies of scale,
single supplier cost advantages, and economies of scope at AT&T and
Bell of Canada (Kiss and Lefebvre 1987), each contributing to lower unit
costs and declining real prices of telephone services. Since 1935 prices for
telephone service rose at half the annual rate of consumer prices (2.1 %
compared to 4.2%).
Since divestiture, however, productivity growth has significantly fallen
below its postwar trend in telecommunication services. Using three dif-
ferent output measures, alternative calculations show that annual labor
productivity growth has fallen from 6.9 percent annually to 3.5 to 4 per-
cent annually (Keefe and Boroff 1994). The drop in the industry's pro-
ductivity growth rate was due, we believe, to a loss of system economies
and a substantial increase in marketing costs, both unintended conse-
quences of competition, and was not simply a result of the disruption
caused by restructuring.
Underlying the Justice Department's insistence on the AT&T divesti-
ture was the belief that long distance service deregulation would usher in
an era of competition utilizing relatively inexpensive and decentralizing
technologies based on satellite and microwave transmission networks
(Rosenberg 1994). Microwave network technology, however, was obso-
lete by the time the AT&T divestiture was implemented; and satellite
communications have been since relegated to a secondary technology pri-
marily used for communicating with remote areas of the world.
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Divestiture, instead, accelerated the deployment of new digital
switches, fiber optic network technologies, and cellular services. The
"systemness" of these technologies demands even higher levels of net-
work integration and interoperability than prior network technologies.
Consequently, the new digital network systems exhibit greater economies
of scale and scope than the analog network they have replaced. These
economies, however, could not be fully realized because of the market
separations contained in the 1983 AT&T Consent Decree and the result-
ing triplication of long distance network facilities, which has spawned
over 500 companies that resell the services of the big three (AT&T, MCI,
and Sprint). The current long distance oligopoly market structure has
produced considerable excess capacity with sufficient facilities to serve
many times the total needs of American consumers. For example, al-
though AT&T accounts for 60 percent of the long distance traffic,
AT&T's competitors alone could readily serve the entire nation's long
distance demand (Allen 1993). In addition, the new competitive market-
place requires that long distance carriers devote an increasing proportion
of their resources to advertising programs (over $3 billion in 1994) for
"True Voice," "Friends and Family," and "The Most."
During the last decade digitalization of network switching and trans-
mission has revolutionized telecommunication services. As network soft-
ware replaces hardware as the principal source of value added, the
telecommunications networks gain an increasing capability to offer a
wide range of services and customization features. Common carriers
working with manufacturers have created software-defined networks
and software capable of delivering customized services for "intelligent
networks." Advanced Intelligent Networks (AIN) will ultimately provide
information suppliers with the flexibility to design their own service net-
works. New switching software will redefine interactive communications
by delivering interactive voice, video, data, and imaging services simulta-
neously over a fully digital network. The new digital network systems
have also created an exploding demand for software and software pro-
grammers to support flexible multi-product networks. Digital switches
are designed with basic operating systems and software platforms that
can be readily expanded. Each year new software upgrades are available
to enhance digital switching capabilities, often allowing new services to
be offered without making any hardware changes. Sales of system soft-
ware upgrades to the regional Bells exceeded $1.2 billion in 1992.
A second technological revolution is underway in transmission sys-
tems. All major common carriers are transforming their analog transmis-
sion systems into broadband integrated services digital networks (ISDN).
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ISDN is an engineering concept, not a technology; it signifies a digitally
switched network that can simultaneously carry digitized video, voice,
data, and imaging transmissions, and it requires a broad transmission
band. Fiber optics is the preferred broadband medium for digital trans-
mission. Light waves pulsed through an optical fiber can carry voice,
data, imaging, and video transmissions simultaneously over the same
strand (integrated broadband) without any electrical distortion or
"noise." Fiber may make existing cable TV and telephone networks tech-
nically obsolete. It is currently deployed on most long distance and toll
routes with growing application as local exchange feeder cable. About
90 percent of the potential circuit usage of fiber, however, is in the local
loop, or what is referred to in the industry as the "last mile" (Bolter
1990:173). It is this last mile that represents the single largest obstacle to
a national digital broadband network.
In the near term, the Regional Bells have opted for a less expensive
broadband solution. It relies on a mixed system of fiber optic cable run
from the central office to a local access point, where the lightwaves are
converted into both digital and analog electrical impulses, which are car-
ried to the home over coaxial cable. Lucent Technologies (formerly
AT&T Transmissions Systems) has solved several technical problems that
will permit the transmission of interactive communications over coaxial
cable. The cost of this new mixed system is slightly more than half of a
fully fiber optic system. This mixed system, however, has a narrower
band width than a fully fiber system, which could potentially limit multi-
media applications.z The regional Bells continue to scale back their plans
for broadband deployment, as they devote more resources to wireless
technologies.
Cellular telephone, an analog technology, grew from no subscribers in
1981 to 35 million in 1995. The next generation of wireless communica-
tions, personal communication services (PCS), a digital network technol-
ogy, should substantially reduce the costs of mobile communications
services and greatly accelerate the use of wireless communications for
voice, data, and fax. Depending on technical innovations and economic
2. Several companies are also committed to fiber optic trials in the local loop. US West,
for example, has undertaken a test in Omaha. It costs $1,500 to hook up a fiber optic
subscriber compared to $1,200 to connect a regular telephone customer; however, projec-
tions indicate that the cost for fiber optic loops should fall to $1,000 within a few years as
the technology advances with practical service experience. In addition, the major cable
television interests, such as Tele-Communications, Inc., Time Warner, and major competi-
tive access provider companies (such as Teleport and Metropolitan Fiber Systems), are bat-
tling to become major local ISDN suppliers.
---
fI
gitally
VOice,
llsslon
trans-
VOice,
: same
on or
s tech-
nd toll
About
e local
(Bolter
:acle to
JenSlVe
ble run
ves are
Ire car-
)rmerly
ms that
coaxial
alf of a
lrrower
t multi-
ir plans
wireless
'ibers in
Dumca-
:echnol-
ications
ions for
;onomlC
. us West,
lber optic
er, proJec-
w years as
ajor cable
r competi-
;), are bat-
~ 1
3
,
'1Y
,1
J
';
.~
,J~
1 .
-\.r-
UNITED STATU J9
feasibility, digital wireless technologies could account for half of all local
access calling within ten years.
These new wire-based and wireless digital broadband network tech-
nologies, make obsolete entire sets of worker skills, while creating de-
mands for computer and software diagnostic capabilities. At the same
time, they permit companies to restructure operations by creating the
opportunity to consolidate organizations into mega-centers for opera-
tions, repair, and customer service. The diffusion of these new technolo-
gies will create more opportunities for further integration that achieve
even greater system economies of scope and scale; however, the pace of
technological development and choice will be ultimately determined by
market demand and by the economic feasibility of the new services. Opti-
mistic projections about exploding demand for new integrated services
in interactive video, data, voice, and imaging often lead to predictions
about industrial convergence among computer hardware and software,
entertainment, information, educational services, telephone equipment,
telephony, cable and broadcast television, wireless, and other ancillary
industries.
Is There a Convergence in Telecommunications Services Markets?
Forecasts of industry convergences, however, often tend to be prema-
ture. Convergence is often thought to arise solely from converging tech-
nologies. Regulatory, managerial, and economic constraints, however,
greatly shape the viability of service market convergence. For example,
at the time of the AT&T divestiture, the business press confidently pre-
dicted the imminent merger of the computer and telephone industries.
In 1982, within hours of the AT&T divestiture agreement, the Justice
Department also dropped its antitrust suit against IBM in part because
AT&T was expected to become a major rival of IBM in the computer
market. Additionally, industry analysts predicted that IBM would be-
come a strong challenger to AT&T in telecommunications. IBM pur-
chased a stake in Rolm, the business premises equipment company, then
entered into an agreement with MCI, leveraging IBM's ownership stake
in Comsat. These two industry leaders were supposed to tear down the
wall between computers and telephony. AT&T lost millions on its invest-
ment in personal computers, however, and finally merged its operation
into its acquisition, NCR, which it has now spun off as a separate com-
pany. IBM retreated from the telephone industry to focus on its implod-
ing computer business. Although convergence between the telephone and
computer industries is still likely, it remains a vision.
More recently, for a brief period in 1993, merger talks between the
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major cable Tv companies and the regional Bells created the impression
that the two industries would quickly converge through corporate merg-
ers. Bell Atlantic's merger with TCI soon failed, followed by the collapse
of the Southwestern and Cox cable merger plans, and by the renegotia-
tion of deals between BellSouth and Prime, and Bell Canada and Jones
Intercable. Although Southwestern Bell had already bought Hauser TV
in suburban Washington D.C., it subsequently explored selling its inter-
est. Only US West, which acquired Continental Cablevision in 1996 and
owns 25.5 percent of Time Warner's stock, remains committed to con-
vergence through corporate merger, although it has been embroiled in a
bitter dispute with Time Warner over its acquisition of Turner Broad-
casting.
At the time of the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
telecommunications services industry was divided into five major market
segments: long distance, within state toll calls, local exchange service,
cable TV, and wireless communications. The Telecommunications Act
will unleash competition in the long distance and toll markets and will
foster competition among the local access providers. In 1995, U.S. tele-
phone service was supplied by over 160 million wire-based telephone
access lines; the seven regional Bell companies and GTE provided 95 per-
cent of the nation's local telephone access service through state-regulated
monopolies. Cable TV supplied television signals to more than 60 million
homes through local franchised monopolies. Between 1984 and 1993
cable TV operated without any regulatory oversight, allowing the com-
panies to generate equity values four times their replacement costs. The
Cable Act of 1992 brought cable TV under federal regulation, which
will expire in 1999 under the new Telecommunications Act. The fastest
growing local access providers are wireless communications companies
that in 1996 supplied cellular services to 35 million customers through
duopoly markets dominated by AT&T, Sprint, GTE, and the regional
BelIs.
As each type of local access service converts to a digital broadband
technology, the providers plan to compete for customers with services
currently offered by another existing technology. For example, modern-
ization of the traditional telephone access lines will permit telephone
companies to offer cable TV; digital upgrades in the cable TV network
will permit internet access and voice communications; and new wireless
technologies will improve voice quality and permit fax and data trans-
missions that will compete with telephone wire-based services. Each
wire-based and wireless access service plans to create new interactive
forms of communications. The Telecommunications Act anticipates that
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these new technologies will create a competitive market for local access
services, progressively eliminating the basis for natural monopolies and
the need for traditional regulatory oversight. Corporate planners, how-
ever, face increasing difficulty in forecasting market growth and poten-
tial competitive losses or gains to any of the alternative technologies,
making investment choices in this capital-intensive industry very risky
and expensive.
In 1995, long distance was the only developed marketplace in telecom-
munications services. AT&T (60 percent share), MCI (20 percent share),
and Sprint (10 percent share) effectively divided the long distance market.
By 1995 the long distance carriers had already gained the right to com-
pete in 35 state area toll service markets. This allowed the long distance
carriers to enter another market that historically subsidized local service
and to compete directly with the regional Bells and GTE for market
share. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 opened up the remaining
intrastate toll markets to the long distance carriers, but at a substantial
cost. The Act gives the regional Bells immediate entry into long distance
markets outside their service areas and the regional Bells will likely gain
the right to enter the long distance markets within their regions by 1999.
Although long distance market shares began to stabilize in 1992, as
calling volume and profitability continued to grow, the entry of the re-
gional Bells and GTE into this lucrative market recreates instability in
the domestic industry. The major long distance carriers, thought to be
the big losers in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, face several major
issues beyond direct competition with the regional Bells and GTE. The
first concerns the long distance access charges paid to local exchange
carriers to guarantee universal service. In 1996, long distance carriers still
paid 45 percent of their long distance revenues to GTE and the regional
Bell companies for access and interconnection to the local exchange net-
work, and these charges still subsidized basic telephone service rates. In
1995, AT&T, MCI, and Sprint were exploring options to enter local tele-
phone service through alliances with cable TV companies, cellular carri-
ers, and competitive access providers to drive down local access charges
and deprive the regional Bells of a major revenue source. The Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 created a Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service to define the scope of universal service and to propose mecha-
nisms for federal support of universal service. The FCC will not decide
the future of access charges and other mechanisms for supporting univer-
sal service until 1998 at the earliest; however, the future of access charges
and other cross subsidies will significantly affect the financial health of
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long distance carriers and local access providers, as well as the cost to
the consumer of basic telephone service.
Second, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that local tele-
phone exchange providers make available access lines at wholesale prices
for resale. In theory, long distance carriers can lease these lines, which
will provide them direct access to their customers. This direct access
allows them to provide a comprehensive set of telecommunications ser-
vices (one-stop-shopping) for their important clients. In an initial experi-
ment AT&T leased lines from Rochester Telephone at a 5 percent
discount, which AT&T found unprofitable, and then abandoned the ex-
periment. Under the new Act, the state commissions will set wholesale
prices. However, they confront a basic problem. The unsubsidized cost
of a local access line is higher than the price charged to the consumer. The
commissions confront a difficult issue in a cross-subsidized environment:
what is the appropriate wholesale price, when the retail price is below
both marginal and average costs? Depending on how local access whole-
sale prices are set, the long distance carriers mayor may not be able to
offer seamless comprehensive services, which they view as critical to their
survival and growth.
Third, each major carrier is building international alliances with for-
eign long distance carriers. British Telecom has purchased 20 percent of
MCI; German and French Telecom have jointly purchased 20 percent of
Sprint. AT&T, while maintaining 70 percent of U.S. originated interna-
tional revenues, is building its "World Partners" network; it already has
ten participating telecommunications companies in Europe and Asia,
who will market AT&T services. Each major U.S. long distance carrier
is participating in the formation of a global oligopoly in telecommunica-
tions services. Will competition from the regional Bells upset the domes-
tic and emerging international oligopoly market structure by creating
more excess capacity in the network and shifting potential alliances?
Even before its enactment, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 pro-
duced corporate restructuring, once its basic elements became known. In
September 1995, AT&T announced its trivestiture into the new AT&T,
a telecommunications services company; Lucent Technologies, a telecom-
munications manufacturer and equipment supplier; and NCR, the former
computer division of AT&T. The disaggregation of AT&T was largely
propelled by a fundamental conflict between marketing telecommunica-
tions services and network equipment. As the Network Services Group
within AT&T had escalated its direct competition with the regional Bells,
the Network Equipment Group's largest customers, the same regional
Bells became increasingly uncomfortable about buying their telecommu-
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nications equipment from their largest competitor. Equipment orders
were canceled. Organizational walls were then built at AT&T between
services and equipment to insure that information obtained in supplying
equipment would not be used by the service divisions to compete with
equipment customers. The advantages of vertical integration thus disap-
peared, leaving only its liabilities. In addition, the acquisition of NCR
had failed to stop a decade of losses for AT&T in the computer business.
Within months of the AT&T trivestiture announcement and weeks
after the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was signed into law, the num-
ber of regional Bells decreased from seven to five. Southwestern Bell Cor-
poration announced plans to acquire Pacific Telesis, and Bell Atlantic
announced its intention to merge with NYNEX. Both aggregations per-
mit further system economies of corporate staff, network control opera-
tions, and customer service centers, while laying the financial basis to
build stronger brand names both regionally and nationally.
The prospective deployment of digital cellular induced rapid changes
in ownership of corporate assets that are symptomatic of future restruc-
turings among local access providers. In 1994, AT&T merged with
McCaw Cellular, the largest U.S. cellular company, putting AT&T into
the local service business. McCaw was a highly leveraged company un-
able to undertake digital modernization of its network, and it was poorly
positioned to acquire new PCS licenses. AT&T's massive financial re-
sources instantly solved both of these problems. Additionally, McCaw's
incipient national cellular network, Cellular One, gained instant visibility
with the AT&T brand name. In response, US West's cellular subsidiary
and Air Touch (the divested Pacific Telesis cellular company) merged.
NYNEX and Bell Atlantic also merged their cellular operations. The lat-
ter four companies, then, formed a partnership that bid on the new PCS
licenses. They also plan to collaborate on developing a national cellular
network with brand name marketing to compete with AT&T's Cellular
One. Sprint's joint venture with three major cable TV companies also bid
on new wireless licenses, but encountered substantial internal problems.
Current trends strongly suggest that the local cellular wireless markets
that are duopolies will restructure into a national oligopoly marketplace
with well recognized brand name providers capable of supplying mobile
voice and data services anywhere in the country. Over the next five years,
all the major telecommunications companies plan to make substantial
investments building digital PCS networks. The anticipated explosive
growth of digital wireless, however, complicates the modernization of
their wire-based networks. Telephone providers have difficulty forecast-
ing how many wire-based customers they may lose to wireless services,
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particularly if cross subsidies for wire-based local access are phased out.
Consequently, investment in cable modernization for residential service
has slowed significantly.
The most anticipated restructuring in local services, however, still in-
volves the local telephone and cable TV companies. The regional Bell
companies are eager to enter cable TV markets, but they lack television
broadcast experience. Several regional Bells have sought to gain this ex-
perience through their international investments. For example, NYNEX
has made investments in Great Britain in order to offer both cable TV
and local telephone service over its network in direct competition with
British Telecom. The cable TV companies probably lack the financial re-
sources necessary to compete with the regional Bells in interactive video
or telephone. The highly leveraged cable TV industry earned revenues of
$22 billion in 1993 compared to the $85 billion earned by local tele-
phone service providers. Each of the major long distance carriers, how-
ever, has entered into discussions with cable TV interests as they seek to
bypass the regional Bells and the cable TV companies seek investment to
upgrade their networks to offer interactive switched services.
To upgrade their facilities for interactive media, the regional Bells will
need to make massive investments. Their financial performance has been
strong since divestiture, greatly assisted by lower interest rates and the
1986 changes in federal tax laws. Since divestiture shareholder wealth
(share price plus reinvested dividends) has grown by more than 50 per-
cent at each RBOC. Providing basic local service remains the regional
Bells' single largest source of revenue ($40 billion), followed by the $19
billion paid by the long distance carriers in access charges to complete
long distance calls. The intrastate toll service is the third largest source
of revenue for the RBOCs, accounting for approximately 13 percent of
their revenue. The regional Bells are also expanding into new unregulated
businesses through fully-owned subsidiaries. These new businesses now
account for 20 percent of the RBOCs' total revenues and are steadily
growing in importance. The regional Bells' fastest growing new busi-
nesses are their cellular services and international operations.
Any excitement about an interactive global information highway,
however, needs to be tempered. There are only a few new services that
are in demand by residential consumers. Only a small segment of the
consuming public may be interested in the new multimedia services that
are being promoted to support the information highway. According to a
1991 AT&T study, for example, almost 40 percent of American house-
holds still use a rotary-dial telephone. In addition, although it is available
to 90 percent of homes, less than two-thirds of American households
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purchase cable 1V service. On the other hand, second line~ for internet
access have rapidly grown, producing a significant revenue source for the
regional Bells.
Market Structure: A Matter of Legislative and Regulatory Uncertainty
In the post-AT&T divestiture period, the FCC and state regulatory
commissions established very different levels and types of regulations for
each telecommunications service market. In fact, regulatory oversight un-
derwent a revolution during the last decade. Similar to the long distance
market, state regulators eliminated some cross subsidies for regional Bell
companies through rate reform and provisions for competitive entry in
local markets. Incentive regulation, price caps on bundles of services, and
deregulation virtually replaced all traditional rate-of-return regulation.
Under incentive regulation, larger-than-targeted cost reductions can be
kept by the local company, thus rewarding efficiencies by enhancing their
profitability. Incentive regulation, however, may also reward companies
for reducing the quality of service to improve earnings. A number of state
commissions have held hearings and fined local companies for failing
to provide adequate levels of service. One state, Oregon, abandoned its
incentive regulation experiment to return to traditional rate and entry
regulation to solve its service problems with US West. Also, bucking the
trend toward deregulation, the cable 1V companies, which had operated
as local monopolies without regulatory oversight since 1984, were
brought under FCC regulation in 1992; the FCC implemented two rate
rollbacks, reducing cable 1V revenue by an estimated $2 billion annually
by 1995.
To implement the Telecommunications Act of 1996, federal and state
regulators must develop rules to accomplish its intention to promote
competition, to preserve universal service, and to support the develop-
ment of innovative services. The Act does not mean the end of regulation;
instead it will change the nature of regulation, shifting more responsibil-
ity toward the federal level and away from the states. Regulatory activity
has increased to historically high levels and should remain high during
the initial rule-making period under the Act, which should end by 1999.
Business Strategy and Structure
Given the turmoil and uncertainty created by new telecommunications
markets and technologies, it is not surprising that organizational restruc-
turing has occurred in fits and starts, with contradictory approaches and
outcomes. Equally important in shaping business restructuring, however,
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are differences in the inherited positions of AT&T and the regional Bell
companies. The interplay between market deregulation and institutional
constraints on actors is the subject of the next section, which briefly out-
lines AT&T's and then the RBOCs' approaches to change.
AT&T: Global Telecommunications Systems
At divestiture in 1984, AT&T retained AT&T Long Lines, its long
distance service provider; Western Electric, its equipment subsidiary; and
Bell Labs, its research laboratories. The new AT&T employed approxi-
mately one-third of the former Bell System workforce at divestiture. The
bulk of the service operations and two-thirds of the employees from the
former Bell System remained with the local telephone companies, placed
under the direction of the seven regional Bells. This division of labor
has had some important consequences for business strategy. First, the
"natural" extension of the long distance and the network equipment
businesses has been international. Just as in the early part of the century,
AT&T's strategy was to use its control over long distance service and
network equipment to gain control over local service and create an inte-
grated system, AT&T's post-divestiture strategy was to leverage its com-
petitive advantage in long distance service and equipment manufacturing
to become a dominant player in global networks. AT&T's strategy, first
and foremost, was to reshape itself as a global corporation. And because
so many global customers are multinational businesses, global service
means providing an integrated set of voice, data, and video services
through a seamless global network. Politically, AT&T has also been at
the forefront of efforts to reduce international barriers to global commu-
nications and to push for deregulation of the public monopolies that have
controlled most national telecommunications systems around the globe.
While the regional Bell operating companies have also had international
aspirations, they have entered international markets primarily by taking
over or forming joint partnerships with national governments to improve
basic domestic services within a country or by competitively entering cel-
lular and cable TV markets.
Within the United States, the division of labor created at divestiture
between AT&T and the RBOCs means that AT&T has only indirect con-
tact-long distance service through access to the local phone compa-
nies-to the massive customer base. The local phone companies, by
contrast, have had a direct and ongoing relationship with customers and
are the ones responsible for maintaining the network infrastructure that
provides basic service. While AT&T continues to be regulated by the
FCC, the Bell operating companies continue mainly under the jurisdic-
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tion of state authorities. They have retained a regional embeddedness
that constrains their behavior in ways that AT&T does not encounter.
Their service base is geographically tied, their political orientation is to
state authorities, their ability to restructure or move operations is limited
to the states in which they currently operate. AT&T, by contrast, covers
the entire country, and has taken advantage of this opportunity to con-
solidate operations and move them to whatever location offers the most
economical choice.
A third difference is that AT&T began dealing with competition in
long distance and equipment manufacturing prior to divestiture. It has
responded rapidly and followed practices that rely on economies of scale
and cost cutting, with labor costs a priority. In 1984, for the first time
since the depression, AT&T employment fell. Post-divestiture AT&T
eliminated over a third of its domestic workforce between 1984 and
1990, equal to its percentage of depression-era layoffs between 1929 and
1935 (Danielian 1939: 208). In the 1980s, network, manufacturing,
and service workers bore the brunt of the layoffs: the nonmanagerial
workforce dropped by 48.5 percent, while the managerial workforce
rose by 4 percent. Additionally, to be competitive with MCI and Sprint,
AT&T reconstructed its long distance network with fiber optic cable and
invested heavily in new digital switching systems-technologies that have
more capacity and provide better service and also need less maintenance.
It cut costs and labor in part by consolidating operator and customer
service offices to a handfull of mega-centers nationwide. This meant not
only fear of job loss and demoralization, but repeated forced moves for
survivors, an issue we discuss more fully in the next section of this
chapter.
To deal with its antiquated organization of functional silos-AT&T
was historically organized into departmental specialties and subspecial-
ties such as network construction, installation, and repair; operator ser-
vices; accounting, and so on-the company created a "decentralized"
and "cross-functional" structure of twenty-two strategic business units
based on national or international market segments. At the same time it
committed itself to a focus on the communications business. Each busi-
ness unit is largely responsible for all functions, from strategy and opera-
tions to marketing and human resources. It also expanded rapidly into
new areas, partnering with Olivetti and then purchasing NCR as a
computer subsidiary, creating AT&T Universal Card (financial services),
acquiring McCaw Cellular, and investing heavily in global communi-
cations.
As AT&T lost the battle to keep the regional Bells out of the long
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distance market, until local service markets were opened and access
charges eliminated, it launched an aggressive strategy to enter all service
market segments with a comprehensive package of telecommunications
services. This strategy made every service provider a potential competi-
tor, which had immediate adverse consequences for its equipment busi-
ness. As a supplier of network equipment and software, AT&T must
have access to proprietary information of its customers to effectively sup-
port and update the network. As more customers came to see AT&T as
a service competitor, they cancelled their contracts for AT&T equipment.
For example, Sprint and MCI have never purchased an AT&T switch.
The economies of scope were once again changing. In September 1995,
AT&T announced that it would divide itself into three new companies.
The telecommunications services company would retain the name
AT&T and seek new integration and scale opportunities within the ser-
vices markets; it accounts for two-thirds of AT&T's revenue, 80 percent
of its profits, but less than 40 percent of its total former workforce. The
AT&Ttelecommunications equipment company, formerly Western Elec-
tric, now Lucent Technologies, is one of the world's largest telecommuni-
cations equipment manufacturers, seeking to take market share from the
crippled Akatel. Finally, after losing billions of dollars in computers since
1984, AT&T spunoff the remnants of its ailing computer business asit
once again exits the personal computer business.
Bell Operating Companies: Regional Services
The regional Bell companies have carefully watched and learned from
AT&T's response to deregulation. They have moved more slowly largely
because competition did not begin entering local markets in a serious
way until the late 1980s. They are following a set of strategies similar to
those of AT&T, but with somewhat different timing: slower entry of the
regional Bells into new markets, slower restructuring and consolidation
into business units, workforce reductions through attrition and early re-
tirement buyouts spread over longer periods so that displacement and
demoralization are less severe. Nonetheless, the workforce in the regu-
lated telephone business of the regional Bells dropped by an average of 28
percent between 1984 and 1992. In the meantime, they began investing
in those unregulated markets allowed by modifications in the divestiture
agreement, such as information services or cellular, and international ser-
vices. Deregulation in local services accelerated in the late 1980s as local
access carriers such as MFS and Teleport were able to construct local
fiber loops in metropolitan areas and skim the cream of the market by
serving the more lucrative business customers. And cable companies,
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with coaxial cable access available to over 90 percent of the households
nationally, may enter some local residential market as soon as legislative
changes take place.
Under these circumstances the regional Bell companies began serious
efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990s to cut costs and downsize, on
the one hand, while trying to introduce workplace reforms to enhance
the quality of service, on the other. It is this juggling of multiple reform
agendas that has created tensions and conflicts because the agenda ap-
pears contradictory to employees.
Changes in strategy and structure among the regional Bell companies
may be summarized as follows. First, they are shifting from being a regu-
lated utility driven by a public service and an "engineering" mentality to
a partially regulated private corporation driven by finance and market-
ing. Their financial decisions are now shaped much more by Wall Street
than by federal and state regulators. Second, they have pushed for
changes in state-regulated rate structures to allow "incentive" struc-
tures-structures that allow them to make a larger profit if they improve
efficiency or productivity beyond a certain level.
Third, the Bells have shifted from a standardized high volume product
market (voice) to a differentiated product market (voice, enhanced ser-
vices such as voice messaging, data, video, image). To support this shift
they have invested in fiber optic cable and integrated services digital net-
works (ISDN) to allow them to carry high speed data, voice, video, and
imaging and remain technologically competitive. Similarly, they have
used the cash generated in the regulated markets to expand in lucrative
nonregulated markets such as information services, cellular, and interna-
tional services. Regulated and nonregulated activities are carried out
under separate subsidiaries.
Fourth, they have recognized that given new low cost entrants (com-
petitors using the latest low-maintenance technology and lower cost,
nonunion labor) they must cut costs; shedding labor has become a pri-
mary goal. While at AT&T nonmanagerial workers have borne the brunt
of workforce reductions, the regional Bells appear to be reducing roughly
proportionate numbers of managers and nonmanagers. For managers,
this means the elimination of at least one level of management, and more
importantly, significant increases in their span of control. But the RBOCs
also realize that they cannot compete on cost alone-that their competi-
tive advantage is in trying to hold on to and build their large customer
base by improving quality and service. The cost of gaining back a cus-
tomer who has left is four times that of keeping the customer in the first
place, according to one company estimate (U.S. Congress 1993: 38). As a
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company executive noted, "We will be extremely sensitive to our existing
customers because we know that our greatest strength lies in holding
onto our $8 billion revenue stream" (Tom Bystrzycki, Vice President,
Mass Markets and Operations, US West Communications, in U.S. Con-
gress 1993: 37). To accomplish this business strategy, they are attempting
simultaneously to implement cost-cutting and -performance-enhancing
strategies-on the one hand radically reducing size through workforce
reductions and reengineering, on the other hand implementing total qual-
ity and employee participation and self-management programs that call
on the commitment and discretionary effort of all employees to enhance
service quality. This mixed strategy creates contradictory incentives for
employees and the outcomes are unclear. The underlying theme is to shift
from a public service culture to an "enterprise culture." While these con-
tradictions have also existed at AT&T, the timing has been different:
AT&T downsized substantially before trying to enlist the good will of
employees. The RBOCs, by contrast, began with participatory ap-
proaches but subsequently embraced widescale downsizing.
Fifth, the RBOCs are restructuring their organizations in ways that
centralize some functions while decentralizing others. On the one hand,
strategic decision making has been centralized at the regional corporate
level. Companies have then taken advantage of economies of scale by
consolidating functions, offices, and staff from the state-Iev,el telephone
company to the regional corporate entity. This centralization has re-
quired further standardization of most technological, organizational, and
management practices. At the same time, to pursue differentiated product
market strategies, the companies have moved network and customer ser-
vice operational decision making from the state level (where it was tradi-
tionally located) to newly-created regional business units defined by
market segment. These "customer-driven" entities are to include most
functions necessary to meet customers' needs. In the past, by contrast,
the state president of the telephone company was the key decisionmaker
because the interface with the state public utility commission dominated
operational decisions (for example, service standards). Departmental
units (network operations, "traffic" or operator services, and customer
service) were independent silos with local actors reporting up parallel
chains of command to their counterparts at the state level.
At the same time that this centralization is occurring, companies are
attempting to decentralize other areas of management decision making
to the local or "district" level (the analogy in manufacturing would be
the plant level)-in keeping with the recommendations of quality and
excellence theorists that "empowering" managers to "get close to the
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customer" is the key to continuous improvement in service quality. The
idea is to free up middle managers to be "entrepreneurs" and encourage
greater cross-functional behavior to solve problems and improve quality
and customer service. Part of the change also involves breaking down the
command-and-control management style of prior eras and replacing it
with a more participatory one of "coaching"-to "empower" workers
to have more discretion in handling customer requests and problems. The
direction of change, then, is to hollow out the old state organizations,
with key operational decisions shifting either up to the regional business
unit or down to the "district" or local managerial level. Responsibilities
of frontline supervisors are in turn shifted to workers in self-managed
teams. This is the vision of new work organization that firms are trying
to implement. Table 1.1 outlines the shift in models of business strategy
and structure under the old and new systems.
Restructuring, however, has also undermined the strong sense of moral
purpose within these organizations. Since 1907 the Bell System promoted
TABLE 1.1. Telecommunications services: business strategy and production
organization
Components Old system New system
Capital market Regulated by FCC, State
PUCs
Partially regulated:
sensitive to stock market
Pricing mechanism Regulated:
Cross-subsidized
(local/long distance)
(residentlbusiness)
Standardized:
Voice
Differentiated:
Voice, data, video, image
Fiber optic transmission; digital
switching
Partially regulated:
More competitive
"Incentive-based"
"Cost-based"
Product market
Technology Cable twisted pair copper
transmission;
Electric, analog, mechanical
switching
Low cost, scale economies Cost, quality, customer service
Segmented service markets,
"market driven"
Competitive advantage
Business strategy Universal public service,
"engineering driven"
Management structure Horizontal
Entrepreneurial
Dual: corporate!business unit
regional/local
Dual: corporate/business unit
regional/local
Vertical
Bureaucratic
Centralized
HRlIR Centralized
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universal and reliable service as a public mission among its employees
(Barnard 1938). The organizations instilled a "spirit of service" that cre-
ated a powerful moral culture throughout the Bell System companies.
The new financial and market-based decision making often collides with
the deeply ingrained spirit of service. Although each of the major compa-
nies is grappling with a new moral purpose promoted through culture
change programs, these new efforts do not resonate among employees,
who still believe the traditional service culture is morally superior to the
new culture of "greed" as it is often characterized. The loss of moral
purpose has contributed greatly to the demoralization of former Bell Sys-
tem employees, a theme we discuss in more detail in the next section.
Labor-Management Relations after Divestiture
AT&T's business restructuring broke its historic social contract with
labor on employment security. As indicated in the previous section,
union-represented employment at AT&T declined from 250,000 at di-
vestiture to 103,000 workers in 1994, representing a 59 percent reduc-
tion in union jobs. As downsizing continues, bargaining unit employment
fell below 100,000 full-time jobs in 1995 (a 60% job reduction). If this
trend of eliminating 1,000 jobs per month is not disrupted the bargaining
unit will disappear at AT&T by 2004. By contrast, while the RBOCs
downsized through attrition and voluntary separations until 1991, they
have since announced workforce reductions of over 100,000; they proj-
ect employment in 1996 to be 70 percent of their 1990 levels. As a result,
it is appropriate to review the consequences of AT&T's downsizing strat-
egy on workforce morale, productivity, and labor-management relations,
the subject of this section.
As a consequence of AT&T's restructuring, employees became demor-
alized over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s. The October 1991
AT&T Employment Security survey, for example, found that bargaining
unit employees had become profoundly pessimistic about their future em-
ployment prospects at AT&T.3 In 1981, a Bell System survey found that
68 percent of nonmanagement employees felt that the company was pro-
viding job security and only 8 percent did not; by 1991 the numbers at
AT&T had more than reversed themselves, with over 73 percent feeling
3. In 1991, we undertook an employee survey at AT&T to evaluate the effectiveness of
the negotiated employment security programs. The survey was mailed on 24 September
1991 by AT&T Transtech to a stratified random sample of 8,100 AT&T bargaining unit
employees. A total of 3,160 employees responded to the single mailing, yielding a response
rate of 39%.
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that there was little job security. In some business units, less than 4 per-
cent of the nonmanagement employees felt there was any job security.
Less than 20 percent of the employees surveyed had confidence in man-
agement's ability to lead and solve the corporation's competitive prob-
lems. Over two-thirds felt they were unable to influence events that affect
their employment at AT&T. And, almost one-half of the employees sur-
veyed had been surplused (had their jobs abolished) at least once. On
average, the surplused employee group had been surplused two and one-
half times.
When compared with attitude data collected at other traumatized or-
ganizations, the intensity of the pessimism of AT&T employees goes be-
yond the negative attitudes found in many of those organizations. There
are probably five reasons for these catastrophic-like responses. First,
many employees chose to work at AT&T because of the Bell System's
commitment to employment security, and now they face chronic insecu-
rity. Second, downsizing has been a protracted ordeal that started in
1984 and continued over a decade later. Third, the average worker who
survived downsizing is immobile with family commitments; he or she is
white, forty-three years old, married with children at home, a home-
owner, a high school graduate with some college, and a CWA member
who has eighteen years of AT&T service and annually earns $26,000
with good benefits. Some 87 percent of the survey respondents wanted
to keep their current jobs until they retire, but less than 10 percent of
them believed that there were any opportunities for advancement at
AT&T. Although AT&T provides severance pay and on occasion induce-
ments for early retirements, few of the remaining workers can afford to
leave. Fourth, AT&T employees use the former Bell System employment
standards, which until recently have remained largely intact at the re-
gional Bell operating companies, to judge the new AT&T's employment
prac~ices. Fifth, AT&T conducts a continuous public relations campaign
emphasizing the strengths of the corporation; the campaign permeates all
corporate activities and appointments. In fact, the executive vice presi-
dent for human resources has a background in public relations, not labor
relations or human resource management. AT&T is widely recognized
as a progressive, innovative employer for its retraining, out-placement
assistance, employee participation, and family leave programs. Many em-
ployees have found it difficult to reconcile AT&T's positive public image
with their recent personal experiences. Also, this positive image enables
corporate executives to engage in denial about the human consequences
of their downsizing decisions. Employees systematically underestimate
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(by 60%) the amount of downsizing that has occurred at AT&T (Boroff
and Keefe 1992).
Following divestiture, downsizing became an increasingly routine part
of business operations. As a result, layoffs rather than voluntary separa-
tions have represented an increasing proportion of the terminations. For
example, during the first two years of post-divestiture operations,
AT&T reduced its overall head count by 56,000. This included 43,928
bargaining unit employees and 12,072 managers. The first downsizing,
however, resulted in layoffs for only one-quarter of the total surplused
population. The remainder left through attrition, voluntary severance,
and early retirement programs, transfers within AT&T, or retreats back
to the regional Bell operating companies. Between 1984 and 1992, a total
of 107,291 AT&T union-represented employees were downsized (Inter-
nal AT&T document). Approximately 58 percent were laid-off, while 42
percent accepted "voluntary" severance packages. An additional 25,709
jobs were reduced by normal turnover. On January 2, 1996, AT&T an-
nounced that 40,000 jobs would be eliminated as part of trivestiture,
most through layoffs. This announcement, which generated a huge public
outcry, departed from prior downsizing at AT&T since it primarily tar-
geted managers. Some 24,000 jobs to be eliminated in trivestiture are
managerial, whereas 16,000 are union represented.
As part of the process to become more competitive, AT&T has been
transforming itself from a predominantly unionized employer (67% or-
ganized) into a nonunion employer (42% organized in the U.S.).
AT&T has acquired and launched nonunion businesses while downsizing
its unionized core operations. AT&T developed two new major non-
union businesses, American Transtech, the largest U.S. telemarketing ser-
vice, and AT&T Universal Card, the second largest credit card company.
AT&T has also acquired two antiunion equipment manufacturers: Para-
dyne (data communications equipment) and, more recently, NCR. NCR
is the sixth largest computer company with 1,300 locations in 130 coun-
tries. In 1990, AT&T classified 147,563 employees as nonmanagement;
97,206 were represented by CWA (66%) and 24,402 were represented
by the IBEW (16%), which yields an 82 percent union density for the
union-eligible workforce. The decline in union coverage at AT&T to only
42 percent of total employees, however, cannot be explained by the
growth of new nonunion hourly employment nor the depopulation of
traditionally unionized jobs.
Primarily, deunionization is occurring at the upper boundary of the
bargaining unit, as management has expanded the scope of supervisory
and managerial job titles and employment. Over 50 percent of AT&T
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employees are now classified as either managerial or supervisory, com-
pared to 29 percent in 1980. This trend is facilitated by U.S. labor law
which excludes from protected activity supervisors, managerial employ-
ees, managers, and professionals who participate in the hiring or evalua-
tions of their peers.
Industry Employment and Unionization
Although AT&T has aggressively downsized its workforce, employ-
ment in the telecommunications service industry declined in the first dec-
ade after divestiture by only 10 percent. In 1992, the industry employed
872,000 employees, down from its peak of 965,000 in 1983. Nonsuper-
visory employment fell to 649,000 a 7 percent decline since 1983.
Slightly more than one-half of the employees in the industry are female,
a proportion that has remained relatively constant over the last decade.
Between 1984 and 1993 the RBOCs, the major employers in the indus-
try, reduced their net employment by 12 percent or by approximately
72,000 jobs, employment in the regulated core businesses dropped by 28
percent, approximately 158,000 jobs, while employment in the nonregu-
lated businesses expanded by over 300 percent.
Unionization has remained stable at the RBOCs, with two-thirds of all
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements, although most
of the new RBOC subsidiaries operate on a nonunion basis. Union cover-
age, however, in the overall telecommunications service industry fell
from 67 percent in 1984 to 48.5 percent in 1994 (Spalter-Roth and Hart-
mann 1995). The 40,000 jobs generated by the growth of the nonunion
long distance carriers, MCI and Sprint, is one major cause of declining
union coverage in the industry. Also, the entry of 500 relatively small
firms that resell long distance services and hundreds of firms that install
customer premise equipment further erodes union coverage.
The convergence of cable TV and local telephone service creates some
serious problems for both the IBEW and CWA. Although some local
cable TV companies are unionized, CWA estimates that of the 10.8,700
union-eligible cable TV workers, only 5 percent are union members. The
largest cable operator, TCI, is aggressively antiunion. Since 1990, TCI
has sponsored six decertific~tion elections-successfully decertifying
CWA in four units. The substantial pay discrepancies between unionized
telephone workers and nonunion cable employees creates the potential
for whipsawing as the unionized employers compete for future cable
modernization work.
The union/nonunion telecommunications wage gap increased from 8
percent to 20 percent between 1990 and 1995 (Spalter-Roth and Hart-
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mann 1995). In sum, an antiunion environment increasingly surrounds
the core of unionized telephone work. Management has steadily ex-
panded its nonunion jurisdiction from above. New competitors, such as
MCI and Sprint, have vigorously resisted unionization; competitive ac-
cess providers Teleport and MFS remain nonunion; the cellular provid-
ers, even the AT&T and Bell subsidiaries, have kept union influence to
a minimum; and cable TV operators remain solidly antiunion. In this
environment, the unions have looked to build new relationships with tra-
ditionally unionized employers.
A New Relationship at AT&T
In 1992, AT&T stock soared by 30 percent, adding $17 billion in mar-
ket value. The company's financial success reflected major improvements
in its operating performance. Starting in 1991, AT&T stabilized its long
distance market share, earning $30 billion in revenue on domestic long
distance and $10 billion on its rapidly growing international service.
AT&T also won three Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Awards,
awarded to AT&T Universal Card, AT&T Transmission Systems, and
AT&T Consumer Communications Services. AT&T's $12.6 billion pur-
chase of McCaw Cellular, the nation's largest cellular company, put
AT&T in the leading position in the cellular market with McCaw's Cellu-
lar One network. Strategically AT&T has defined itself as a networking
company, where all lines of business must add value to the network and
create value for the shareholders. AT&T's top strategic objective is to
transform itself into a global corporation. To become a global competi-
tor, the corporation planned to generate 50 percent of its earnings from
international sales by the year 2000, up from essentially nothing at di-
vestiture. AT&T employs 53,000 people or 17 percent of its workforce
overseas.
During 1992, the relationships between AT&T and its two unions im-
proved. They negotiated a three-year agreement that created a new
framework for labor-management relations, called Workplace of the Fu-
ture. The structure permits the unions to participate in Business Unit
Planning Councils, and the contract requires that the unions select bar:-
gaining unit participants for the program. Through this involvement, the
unions hope to develop plans to increase employees' discretion to provide
quality service to the customer, influence restructuring and downsizing,
and shape the structure and format for participative teams. If a Planning
Council's program conflicts with existing contract language, it can apply
for an exemption through the national Constructive Relationship Coun-
cil. On 8 March 1993, the CWA and AT&T held a conference for one
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thousand managers and union representatives to kick off Workplace of
the Future. An enthusiastic Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, in his key-
note speech commended the parties for their shared vision. AT&T and
the IBEW held a similar conference in June 1993.
Other developments further encouraged the union leadership that
AT&T was reversing its nonunion direction. Contract provisions negoti-
ated in 1992 allow union members to transfer to nonunion subsidiaries-
except NCR (renamed AT&T Global Information Solutions). The union
also gained neutrality and card check provisions at some subsidiaries,
and disputes over neutrality are arbitrable. In 1995, the company and
unions negotiated contractual language that addresses union values.
Opponents of Workplace of the Future, however, remain in powerful
positions at both unions and AT&T. As of 1996, four members of the
CWA Executive Board continued to oppose the union's participation in
the program. At AT&T, engineering and finance managers created labor-
management instability through their ongoing commitment to major cost
reductions, further downsizing, part-timing, and subcontracting of bar-
gaining unit work.
Although negotiated in 1992, the Workplace of the Future process has
diffused fully in only one business unit, the NetWork Services Division,
the organization responsible for running the long distance netWork,
where the union retains considerable strength. Union success in this joint
program rests on the same foundation as successful collective bargaining,
and that is bargaining power. Where the union is weak, labor participa-
tion in business decision making is often ephemeral or takes the form of
post-decision-making consultations. For the union, decades of central-
ized collective bargaining have not prepared the secondary levels of lead-
ership to participate in business decision making, because historically
those issues were addressed at the top levels of the union.
Most importantly, however, when the CWA successfully organized a
majority of potential members at American Transtech to sign union rec-
ognition cards, the company's neutrality pledge evaporated. Ignoring the
neutrality provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, the presi-
dent of American Transtech hired a law firm to engage in a full-fledged
union suppression campaign and the union lost the representation elec-
tion in 1995, souring the new relationship.
CWA's Strategic Responses to Industry Restructuring
The Communications Workers of America has been heralded as a
union that engages in strategic planning (Dunlop 1990). Prior to divesti-
ture, under the leadership of President Glenn Watts, CWA engaged in a
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systematic strategic planning process through the Committee on the Fu-
ture, created in July 1981. In March 1983, a special convention adopted
ten resolutions and two constitutional amendments proposed by the
committee.4 The administrative reforms improved the union's internal
operations. In 1986 and 1987, to improve its operating effectiveness,
CWA further streamlined its governing structure.
In the legislative arena, the CWA joined the RBOCs in promoting legis-
lation that would allow them to enter the domestic equipment manufac-
turing business and long distance service-reforms that AT&T opposed.
The CWA and the IBEW also supported the RBOCs effort to supply cable
TV and information services. In addition, Morton Bahr, president of the
CWA, sits on the national Democratic party's leadership committee and
serves on Vice President Gore's influential council on the national infor-
mation infrastructure.
At the state level, CWA policies on deregulation have varied by district.
In the South, CWA District 3 supported deregulation, while in the North-
east, CWA Districts 1 and 2 opposed telephone deregulation. Since 1995,
however, the CWA and the IBEW have been working together to form a
coalition with consumer groups to contain the most damaging effects of
deregulation, based on the twin goals of preserving union jobs and uni-
versal telephone service at reasonable rates.
CWA's major strategic goal is "Wall-to-Wall" unionization in the in-
formation industry. Since divestiture, CWA has added 85,000 new mem-
bers in the telecommunications industry, primarily through mergers.
Mergers with several Telephone Independent Unions after the divestiture
announcement added 40,000 members. In 1987, CWA merged with the
International Typographical Union, as America's oldest union (founded
in 1852) grappled with declining membership as a result of the diffusion
of computerized typesetting. In 1993, CWA merged with the National
Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians with members in
the broadcast and cable TV industries; and in 1995 it merged with the
Newspaper Guild.
Since divestiture CWA has organized 5,000 AT&T employees under
neutrality provisions. CWA has been organizing at NCR and American
Transtech, both AT&T subsidiaries. At NCR the CWA is organizing field
engineers at twenty locations. For this national campaign the CWA set
4. However, the union's analysis of the changing environment was wrong. Following
AT&T's lead, the CWA leadership thought that the newly competitive AT&T would be the
dynamic growth area for employment and union membership, while the Bell operating
companies would be relatively stagnant with declining employment and membership.
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up the National Association ofNCR Employees (NANE). By early 1994,
approximately 400 field engineers had joined. The union runs an elec-
tronic bulletin board to keep members and organizers informed and to
allow them to communicate with each other. CWA has also undertaken
a corporate campaign to press AT&T for neutrality and access rights.
NCR has vigorously resisted the organizing drive, hiring Jackson and
Lewis, the well-known union-busting law firm, to organize their re-
sponse.
By contrast, under the neutrality provisions contained in the 1992 col-
lective bargaining agreement, CWA began organizing at Transtech.
Transtech employs 1,500 managers, 600 regular workers, and 3,500 tem-
porary employees. The Transtech Employees Association seeks to repre-
sent both the 600 regular Transtech employees and the 3,500 temporary
employees at Transtech that are contracted through eight employment
agencies. The temporary employees earn about eight dollars an hour with
no benefits. They move from project to project for employment at Trans-
tech. The union was demanding that these workers be made regular
AT&T employees. Under the neutrality provisions of the AT&T collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the union thought it had gained managerial
neutrality and access to non-work areas. Yet, as discussed above, once
the election campaign began, Transtech management conducted an ag-
gressive antiunion campaign, defeating the union in the election and poi-
soning the labor-management relationship.
Although the CWA and the IBEW have developed two sophisticated
organizing departments, they have had little success in organizing the
new aggressively antiunion competitors, such as MCI and Sprint, al-
though the CWA has mounted another campaign at Sprint. At the local
level, the two unions have organized some cable 1V franchises, but the
major cable corporations have maintained an aggressive antiunion pos-
ture. The growth of this nonunion sector has the potential to destabilize
collective bargaining in the unionized core.
In collective bargaining, the CWA has sought to maintain a loose pat-
tern on major economic issues and has generally succeeded. The union
particularly wants to prevent any substandard agreements in the indus-
try, which could then set patterns for other contracts. The CWA has been
successful in keeping a pattern together. To advance its interest, the union
has engaged in strikes, developed a member mobilization program, and
used workplace campaigns. In 1983, 1986, and 1989 the CWA under-
took strikes to oppose concessions in health insurance. Concessions are
difficult to sell to the membership, particularly when the companies are
earning higher profits than ever possible under the regulated Bell System.
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The growth of nonunion competition in virtually every market segment,
however, is putting downward pressure on wages and benefits.
In August 1988, CWA launched its Mobilization Program in prepara-
tion for 1989 bargaining. Mobilization is grass roots organizing that in-
volves members in one-on-one communication on important issues at the
work site. The program's basic aim is to involve all union members in
actively representing their collective interest. The campaigns are designed
to connect "the bonds of worker solidarity" through collective action.
Mobilization tactics include petitions; one-on-one postcard messages;
wearing common colors; expressing solidarity through rallies, arm
bands, and stand-ups; work-to-rule campaigns; organizing nonmembers;
on-site and electronic picket lines; community support activities; and
strikes.
The mobilization programs have steadily improved in effectiveness
since 1988 and were particularly useful in 1992 bargaining. Rather than
strike, CWA continued to bargain after the contract expirations at
AT&T, Bell Atlantic, Pacific Telesis, and US West. The membership mo-
bilized to support the union's bargaining objectives. Electronic town
meetings, conference calls, and taped telephone messages kept members
involved and informed about bargaining progress. At AT&T the unions
threatened an electronic picket line by getting all their supporters to
pledge to switch their long distance phone service to another carrier until
a contract was signed. Some CWA locals demonstrated their mastery of
information technologies in getting the union's story out to their mem-
bers and to management. CWA has also developed its in-workplace strat-
egies. The union believes that these tactics will grow in power as
employers rely more and more on a committed and involved workforce
td provide high quality customer service.
In 1995, the union once again extended contract expiration dates and
was able to achieve contracts without any strikes. At Bell Atlantic, how- .
ever, the parties reached an agreement five months after the contract ex-
piration date. The union won base wage increases of either 10.9 percent
or 11 percent in each of the major contracts. Retiree health insurance
will continue to be paid by the companies during the life of the agree-
ment. Except for the NYNEX agreement negotiated in 1994 which lim-
ited layoffs, the other contracts did not limit the force reductions that the
companies are undertaking. Most, however, improved transfer rights
and/or severance benefits.
The industry-wide force reductions have serious implications for the
stability of the CWA's internal governing coalition. The telephone instal-
lation and central office crafts have been the main pillar of political
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power within the union, often in coalition with operators. Each of these
groups has experienced massive downsizing. Historically, local, district,
and national leaders in the CWA came from the ranks of telephone instal-
lation and central office crafts, with one major exception, the president
of the union. Joseph Beirne worked in Western Electric sales in New Jer-
sey and New York; Glenn Watts started out representing the C&P Com-
mercial Department in Washington, D.C.; and Morton Bahr began with
the independent MacKay Radio, in ship-to-shore radio on Long Island.
Because each of these leaders began in groups with little influence over
union affairs, each became effective coalition builders. With the decline
of the traditional union power bases, a new female leadership is emerging
at the local, district, and national level. Secretary-Treasurer Barbara Eas-
terling and District Vice Presidents Sue Pisha (District 7-US West) and
Janice Wood (District 9-Pacific Telesis) are indicators of the changes
underway inside CWA.
Local Unions
Grievance administration remains the primary function of the local
unions in the telephone industry. The local unions' representation pro-
vides a buffer for workers who can easily be caught between the formal
bureaucratic control system and the informal, but widely followed, work
practices. Research evidence indicates that effective grievance representa-
tion, particularly winning grievances, remains the single most important
activity in building the membership's commitment to the local union.
Employee participation and other work innovation which reduce tradi-
tional methods of bureaucratic control and legitimize informal practices
also have the potential to build the local union. Research also suggests
that union participation in work reform improves member loyalty and
does not undermine the union (Eaton, Gordon, and Keefe 1992; Vallas
1993).
The Post-Divestiture Collective Bargaining Process and Structure
Prior to divestiture, AT&T and its Bell operating companies bargained
at two levels. At the first level, called "national bargaining," system-wide
agreements covered wages, benefits, and employment security. As a re-
sult, a telephone technician working in New York City received the same
relative wage increases whether he or she worked for the local operating
company, New York Telephone, or for AT&T. The cents-per-hour com-
ponent of the cost of living escalator tended to compress the wage struc-
ture throughout the Bell System (Keefe 1989). In a similar manner,
vacations, pension benefits, health care coverage, and insurance benefits
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became more standardized across the system, regardless of the employing
Bell company. This standardization aided human resource planning and
force adjustments by facilitating personnel movement among the compa-
nies. At the second level of bargaining, "local" bargaining, the individual
Bell operating companies bargained with local union leadership over
work administration and work rules. Local bargaining issues included
overtime policy, posting of schedules, steps in the grievance process,
health and safety, and absence pay. Local bargainers, however, could not
address issues that were on the national bargaining table.
With divestiture came a restructuring of labor relations. Shortly after
divestiture, AT&T successfully removed itself from the common expira-
tion dates established in telephone bargaining. AT&T and its unions re-
negotiated the termination date of its 1983 contract from 9 August to 31
May 1986. This removed AT&T from the contract termination deadline
of 9 August 1986, faced by the RBOCs. As a result, cross-company com-
parisons would not be made, and the pressure to conform to a potentially
more expensive RBOC pattern would be lessened.
Since the core business of the regional Bells had remained relatively
unchanged, the expectations about bargaining were similarly unchanged.
Initially, CWA sought to maintain a national bargaining structure (Koch,
Lewin, and Sockell 1988). When the companies rejected that proposal,
CWA pressed for continuance of the two-tier structure, with the first tier
at the regional Bell-level and the second tier remaining at the local operat-
ing company level. Eventually, all the regional Bells opted for this two-
tier structure, except for Ameritech which continued to negotiate at the
local company level through 1992. Bargaining has taken place in this
new structure in 1986, 1989, 1992, and 1995. Some companies, how-
ever, including BellSouth, US West, and NYNEX, expanded the scope of
regional bargaining and standardized contract provisions across the local
companies to improve operating efficiency.
With the restructuring of the RBOCs away from regulated state orga-
nizations toward market oriented businesses, pressures are building to
change the two-tier bargaining structure. As former Bell companies reor-
ganize along their lines of business (as discussed in the last section), we
anticipate they will emulate AT&T and push for a new two-tier structure:
one at the regional corporate level and the second organized around re-
gional business units rather than local geography. AT&T's Workplace of
the Future represents an interim step in a similar process, where the CWA
and IBEW representatives meet with business unit executives in business
unit planning councils to discuss workplace programs. US West and
CWA already developed a separate agreement for its customer service
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division, Home and Personal Services Division in 1992; and in 1995,
Ameritech bargained in a two-tier structure for the first time, agreeing to
centralize bargaining at the regional level in exchange for union accep-
tance of local bargaining with business unit organizations. While local
structures may continue to change, we believe that economic issues will
remain relatively centralized in regional bargaining for the regional Bells
and in national bargaining for AT&T.
Pressures for Pattern Bargaining
CWA maintains a loose pattern bargain across the industry on eco-
nomic issues, receiving considerable assistance from AT&T and the re-
gional Bells. Although the newly competitive AT&T was permitted to
escape the common expiration date starting in 1986, it not only remains
a participant in the loose pattern, but on some issues has become a pat-
tern setter for the RBOCs, for example, on wages. Only NYNEX negoti-
ations in 1989, 1991, and 1994 produced pattern-breaking agreements.
AT&T and the regional Bells, however, faced different problems in the
1980s and early 1990s. Employment security has been the most difficult
bargaining issue at AT&T, whereas health insurance has been a strike
issue at four regional Bells. With state incentive regulation, employment
security has become central to RBOC bargaining as well.
Because of increasingly stringent financial scrutiny by Wall Street and
regulators, strategic economic issues have exerted a centralizing influence
on the industry's post-divestiture bargaining structure. Deferred wage in-
creases have averaged 2.78 percent annually, COLAs have been either
eliminated or highly restricted, and each company has obtained some
form of contingent pay, most commonly profit sharing. In either 1986 or
1989 all companies but NYNEX adopted preferred provider organiza-
tions to deliver their basic health insurance, a change that limits employ-
ees' choice of health care options. Most agreements contain expanded
transfer rights, retraining, early retirement incentives, and severance pay
enhancements to address employment security. Only Pacific Telesis and
Southwest Bell, however, made no layoff commitments during this pe-
riod. In 1994, NYNEX extended a new no-layoff commitment as part of
its massive downsizing package, which is to be accomplished with volun-
tary separations.
In contrast, union institutional security and work administration issues
arising from business reorganizations, new technologies, nonunion com-
petition, and work restructuring exert a decentralizing influence on local
bargaining structures. A 1992 CWA survey found that there were over
thirty different local participative programs in operation at AT&T, the
--
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content of which we take up more fully in the fourth part of this chapter.
Some of these programs had union participation and others did not. In
the former Bell System companies, Quality of Work Life (QWL) became
known as a "labor" program, since it was negotiated by labor relations.
QWL always had union involvement, while Total Quality is often viewed
as a management participative program, because it is not negotiated and
rarely had union involvement (Batt 1993). All the regional Bells and
AT&T have adopted workplace reforms such as QWL, quality teams,
and self-managed teams; however, they have varied significantly in their
degree of corporate commitment, on the one hand, and union involve-
ment, on the other. The latest generation of joint involvement programs
focuses most often upon continuously improving customer service. Stra-
tegically for the unions, retaining the loyalty of the embedded customer
base is essential to preserving jobs in the newly competitive markets.
CW A District 3 and BellSouth have been leaders in these joint labor-
management, workplace redesign, and participative programs (see Batt
1993). Next to NYNEX (see below), BellSouth has agreed to the most
far-reaching union security provisions in the industry, including broader
bargaining unit recognition and accretion. Corporate commitments to
union institutional security, employment security, and union and worker
participation to improve performance are tied closely together in the in-
dustry. Security is exchanged for participation in improving performance
(Batt 1993).
NYNEX Departs from the Pattern
NYNEX, the regional Bell operating company for New York and New
England, appeared to be emphasizing a narrowly cost-cutting path in
response to local competitOrs such as Teleport and MFS, until an historic
turnaround in 1991. NYNEX has a history of the worst labor-manage-
ment relations in the industry. The CWA waged a bitter seven-month
strike at New York Telephone in 1971 over wages and union security;
and in 1989, the CWA and the IBEW joined forces to win a four-month
strike against NYNEX to maintain their health benefits. (NYNEX is the
only former Bell company that has maintained its traditional health in-
surance coverage). As a result of the strike, NYNEX hired James Dow-
dall from AT&T to change its relationship with the unions; Dowdall's
experience at AT&T provided him with considerable credibility with the
unions. The subsequent round of negotiations covering 57,000 workers
led to a new labor agreement eleven months early, settling in September
1991. The four-year agreement provided 4 percent annual wage increases
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over the life of the agreement, more than any other contract in the in-
dustry.
NYNEX has continued this new approach to labor-management rela-
tions even in the wake of announced downsizing. In 1991 and 1992,
negotiated provisions for enhanced early retirement led 7,300 nonman-
agement employees to take voluntary settlement packages, while some
3,400 managers were laid off. Similarly, in December 1993, the Wall
Street Journal reported that NYNEX would reduce its workforce by
22,200 jobs over the next three years. Shortly thereafter, NYNEX en-
tered into negotiations with the CWA, and the parties reached an agree-
ment in March 1994, which extends the existing contract through
August 1998. Contract provisions under the 1994 agreement contain the
most far-reaching employment security framework in the industry. They
include a special retirement incentive that adds six years to both service
and age and a 30 percent social security supplement until age 62 or a
$500 annual bonus, whichever is greater. The company estimated that
the incentive program would lead to the voluntary elimination of 16,800
jobs at NYNEX at a cost of over $2 billion or $77,000 per participating
employee.
.
While a major thrust of this program is to induce workers to leave the
company voluntarily, other components seek to create a future for the
surviving workforce. No worker can be laid off from NYNEX due to
changes in organization, work process, or new technology. Layoffs are
permitted only in response to volume reductions. A major innovation is
the creation of a two-year associate's degree program in telecommunica-
tions technology, which is to open to all nonmanagement workers. The
employees work four days a week and go to school the fifth day on com-
pany time during the academic year. The company pays all educational
expenses. Employees begin receiving top craft pay upon entering the pro-
gram. Upon graduation, employees receive an additional $50 a week in-
crease. NYNEX recognizes that it is a high labor cost employer and
hopes to offset this cost disadvantage with a highly educated, flexible,
and productive work force.
In addition, all NYNEX employees with five years of service are eligi-
ble to take a two-year educational leave. They can receive up to $10,000
per year for educational expenses while retaining full benefits, seniority,
and a guaranteed job when they return. The contract also creates a job
bank and a new job-sharing provision. Union workers are guaranteed
access to all new NYNEX ventures in the information industry. New
subsidiaries start by offering union workers the opportunity to bid into
the new jobs. Neutrality and card-check recognition apply in any non-
-
66 JEFFREY H. KEEFE and ROSEMARY BAlT
union NYNEX entity. Wage increases are 4 percent in 1994 and in 1995,
3.5 percent in 1996, and 3 percent in 1997, with an additional 3.23 per-
cent in stock and cash bonuses over the term. Cost of living protection
kicks in if inflation exceeds 8 percent. The fully paid medical plan contin-
ues for the life of the agreement.
While maintaining a traditional arms-length labor-management rela-
tionship, NYNEX and the CWA have created a framework that can dra-
matically turn around their relationship. Notably, it is not based on
employee or union participation in productivity-enhancing partnership,
but on creating a high-skilled future for the incumbent work force while
humanely reducing employment. Through this formula, the parties hope
to avoid the decade of employee trauma that AT&T has experienced.
Reorganizing Work and Internal Labor Markets
In the first section of this chapter we argued that the digitalization of the
network has enhanced scale and scope economies, creating new opportu-
nities for consolidation and centralization. At the same time market de-
regulation has led to market segmentation and fragmentation, a trend
that lends itself to decentralized market-responsive strategies. We then
outlined how these competing logics of centralization and decentraliza-
tion have played out with respect to business strategy and structure and
labor-management relations. This final section continues these themes at
the level of distinct occupational groups in the Bell system. We show how
the two competing approaches to restructuring have significantly altered
the internal labor market rules that shape the jobs and careers of network
craft workers, customer service representatives, operators, and managers
of these groups.
Specifically, the first approach to reform uses union and employee par-
ticipation to improve service quality through the redesign of jobs and
human resource practices. According to this logic, employees provide
better service if they have the opportunity to offer innovative solutions
(employee participation), if they have the autonomy to meet customer
needs (job redesign), and if they have the appropriate skills (education
and training) and incentives (career opportunities, employment security,
compensation) to make a commitment to the company. In this view, com-
mitment is a two-way street; if the company shows its commitment to
enhancing the jobs and careers of employees, then employees will commit
themselves to making the company competitive. This approach has a
decentralizing thrust because it relies on the talent and creativity of em-
ployees at the point of contact with the customer.
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The second approach focuses on realizing scale economies and cutting
costs through consolidations, new applications of technology, reengin-
eering, and downsizing. It begins at the macro organizational level and
relies on top management, consultants, and engineers to develop system-
wide innovations. The approach relies on centralized decision making
rather than decentralized discretion. Changes in the design of jobs and
human resource practices flow as a consequence of new technologies and
organizational restructuring. Because of this logic, companies do not
make prior commitments to job enhancement or employment security.
The two approaches are, therefore, in conflict.
At AT&T and the regional Bell companies, the second approach has
dominated, and often undermined, the first. In 1984, AT&T began with
the macro approach, and as indicated above, shed 60 percent of its do-
mestic unionized workforce. It unilaterally introduced experiments with
participation and teams in the late 1980s; but it was not until 1992 that
it developed a joint union-management approach to job redesign which
builds on the logic of decentralized participation. The regional Bells, by
contrast, experimented more fully with participatory approaches in the
1980s, but by the early 1990s as local deregulation approached, they
shifted gears, halted some of these experiments, and focused more fully
on consolidation and reengineering.
While the shape of jobs and careers in the post-divestiture era is still
uncertain, the evidence suggests that companies have chosen to focus on
the benefits of scale economies and system integration. Two explanations
are plausible, and both are probably at work. First, in the deregulated
environment, the low-wage, nonunion option is available for the first
time, and companies have taken advantage of what is a quick-fix solution
to competitiveness-lowering costs and improving shareholder dividends
at the expense of a weakened labor movement. Second, the integrated
nature, or "systemness" of telecommunications services means that com-
panies can continue to reap tremendous scale economies, particularly
given the centralizing nature of new technologies, as discussed in the first
section of this chapter. Both of these industry dynamics put at risk the
participatory and job enhancing approach to quality service that total
quality theorists and others advocate.
This section is divided into three parts. The first part briefly describes
the pre-divestiture system of work organization and internal labor mar-
kets in the Bell System. The second part reviews trends in job redesign
and shows how the competing logics of cost cutting versus job enhance-
ment have played out for each of four occupational groups: network
cra&s, customer services, operators, and managers of these occupational
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groups. The third part outlines the new internal labor markets that are
emergmg.
Pre-Divestiture Work Organization and Internal Labor Markets
The stability of the AT&T work system prior to divestiture was one of
its most salient characteristics. Its framework was largely set in place
before World War I when AT&T used its control of patents and long
distance service to purchase controlling interest in local operating compa-
nies around the country. Through license contracts with the operating
companies, AT&T required the useof standardized technology (AT&T's
equipment manufactured at its wholly-owned subsidiary, Western Elec-
tric, since 1881) as well as standard operating procedures-the Bell
System Practices. AT&T's control created a functionally specialized, top-
down, command-and-control organization early on. Corporate paternal-
ism and implicit long-term employment relations also date to this period,
when the company introduced the "American Plan" of benefits to build
loyalty and long-term commitment to the firm. From World War I to
1937, AT&T successfully launched company unions as an alternative to
independent trade unionism, and embraced the human relations move-
ment, offering its Western Electric Hawthorne plant for Elton Mayo and
F. J. Roethlisberger's experiments in industrial psychology (Roethlis-
berger and Dickson 1939). In the meantime, Chester Barnard, at that time
president of New JerseyBell, completed his theory of cooperative indus-
trial organization-the corporation as a cooperative system with a moral
purpose-based on his experience at New Jersey Bell (1938). Through-
out this period, AT&T provided high and steady dividends to sharehold-
ers, and was minimally regulated by state and federal authorities.
In the post-World War II period, state and federal regulators put in-
creasing pressure on the Bell System both to keep rates down and to
expand universal service. AT&T developed two managerial strategies.
First, to minimize costs and reap scale economies, it sought to apply new
technologies that reduced the labor content of jobs. This strategy met
with mixed success because some jobs (operator services) lent themselves
to Taylorism more than others (customer services and network craft).
The result was a very mixed production system that varied by occupa-
tional group, as we describe in greater detail below. Second, where tech-
nology did not pace labor, AT&T adopted a strategy of "management
by numbers" to increase productivity and meet the monitoring require-
ments of regulators. The result was a phenomenal growth in bureaucracy
as the managerial staff swelled from 13.5 percent to 29 percent of the
workforce (AT&T 1982).
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The functional organization of AT&T in 1980 closely resembled the
company's framework in 1945 or in 1910. Both AT&T and the Bell op-
erating companies had three basic components: Plant (network), Traffic
(operator services), and Commercial (business office/customer service).
Additionally, the General Department provided administrative support
functions that included Accounting, Legal, Regulatory, and Personnel.
Each functional division, or occupational specialty, had a unique pro-
duction logic. Network may best be compared to a continuous process
industry in which highly skilled craft workers maintained the switching
and transmission equipment needed for the continuous flow of dial tone
(for a detailed discussion, see Keefe 1995). They did not produce a com-
modity, but maintained the infrastructure needed to transmit telephone
communications, just as workers in oil refinery or chemical processing
build and maintain the infrastructure through which liquids flow. Be-
cause of the nature of the work, throughout the post-World War II pe-
riod, these jobs continued to require high skill, completion of a whole
task (craft-like), and considerable autonomy for crews maintaining a
highly geographically-dispersed infrastructure.
On the service side, customer services consisted of thousands of local
business offices in which "universal" service representatives answered all
questions and concerns of customers. Until the 1980s, jobs were quite
varied and required considerable skill, and may best be thought of as
providing highly personalized or specialized business services.
In contrast to network and customer services, operator services began
as a mass production operation, with AT&T applying scientific manage-
ment (Taylorism) to operator jobs by the turn of the century (Norwood
1990: 33-40). It was also unique because it was part of both network
and services: operators were the "human switch" in the continuous proc-
ess industry, making connections where machines could not; they were
also the human face of the telephone company-the most frequent cus-
tomer contact point in providing assistance or information. While opera-
tors' jobs were organized along industrial lines,however, they were
classified as female service jobs for purposes of pay and promotion.
Changing employment levels of these occupational groups reflect dif-
ferences in work organization. With the growth of the Bell System, the
numbers of skilled workers in network and customer services steadily
increased between 1950 and 198O-from 24 to 44 percent of the work-
force (network) and from 5.3 to 11.1 percent (customer services). By
contrast, the number of operators fell by fifty percent between 1950,
when they comprised 47 percent of the workforce, and 1980, when they
dropped to 16 percent (AT&T 1982).
.--
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Consistent with this unequal application of Taylorism to different oc-
cupational groups are trends in the ratio of supervisors to workers across
departments. In operator services, the ratio increased from 1:6 in 1910
to 1:20 in 1980 as electronic monitoring absorbed supervisory functions.
By contrast, the ratio in network craft occupations in 1980 was 1:6, and
in customer service occupations, 1:10.
Within each functional division, the Bell system created additional sub-
divisions with occupational specialties and short job ladders (usually two
steps in network and three in services). These functional divisions and
job ladders are outlined in Figure 1.1. For female-dominated service jobs,
FIGURE 1.1.
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low-level clerical or operator positions were the two ports of entry. From
there, women could advance to skilled clerical work in different depart-
ments or to customer service jobs. The business office and repair service
bureaus had three-tiered job ladders from entry clerical to customer ser-
vice positions. The top job in the business office paid less than an entry
level craft job.
In Network, subdivisions included Engineering, Construction (Long
Lines at AT&T and Cable Construction and Maintenance at the operat-
ing companies), Central Office (switching and transmission equipment),
and Installation and Repair (I&R) of customer premise equipment (CPE).
Engineering consisted primarily of engineers who designed the network
infrastructure, aided by the highest-paid craft job, engineering assistants,
who usually came from the top crafts in construction or I&R. AT&T
Long Lines built and maintained the long distance "trunk lines" connect-
ing Central Office switches in different geographic locations to a long
distance network controlled by toll switches. Operating company con-
struction departments built and maintained the cables between the Cen-
tral Office switches and the customer premises. Within Long Lines, there
also were inside and outside crafts. Inside crafts consisted of entry-level
frame attendants who ran wiring for each telephone number and installa-
tion and the higher-skilled central office switching technicians who main-
tained the electromechanical switches. Outside crafts included cable
splicers' helpers (until the 1960s), higher-skilled linemen (line gangs) who
built the pole lines and placed the cable, and higher-skilled cable splicers
who spliced and repaired telephone cable. Installation and repair also
had two grades: I&R (or service technicians) who placed and repaired
the service wires and telephone sets on customer premises and PBX (pri-
vate branch exchanges) or special services technicians, who installed and
repaired PBX equipment in businesses and other special services such as
data lines or fire alarms. Particularly in urban areas, companies further
divided jobs within pay grades, with junior workers getting the less
. skilled and more difficult manual or "dirty work." Switching technicians
specialized in particular switches; linemen would specialize in aerial,
underground, or buried cable. The hierarchy of I&R service technician
jobs was: residential installation, residential repair, business installation,
business repair.
Historically, strong occupational subcultures emerged in these func-
tional departments due to corporate policies of occupational segregation.
John Schacht notes, "white-collar workers in the accounting and com-
mercial departments looked down on both the traffic operator and the
'greasy plant man out there climbing poles, with creosote all over him.'
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. . . In the commercial departments, particularly, insularity was encour-
aged by the company practice of paying monthly or bimonthly salaries,
as distinguished from weekly wages in the other departments. Along with
this practice went messages designed to nourished feelings of elitism,
messages. . . that 'you [customer services] are the telephone company in
the eyes of the public' and therefore 'the elite' " (Schacht 1985: 22). Net-
work craft cultures also split along white collar (inside craft) and blue
collar (outside craft) lines. Historically, network craft and operators or~
ganized separate union locals, while business and accounting resisted
unionization. These subcultures continue to be robust. While the 1970s
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) law suit against.
AT&T forced the opening of some craft jobs for women (for example,
I&R jobs), occupational segregation has been quite resilient. At an early
date AT&T also created a largely native white workforce, segregated
from immigrants and Afro-Americans, through the high educational re-
quirements and the entrance examinations for entry-level jobs. As early
as the 1920s and 1930s, the median number of school years for operators
was 11.8, compared to 10.8 for all u.S. female workers; comparable
figures for AT&T network craft workers were 10.5 years versus 8.7 years
for all u.S. males (Schacht 1985: 23-24).
Internal labor markets resembled the classic industrial markets de-
scribed by Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore (1971). While the over-
whelming majority of workers never rose beyond craft levels, they
enjoyed lifetime jobs. Moreover, an important minority reached middle
management positions during the growth years of the 1950s through
1970s. Paternalistic employment practices dated to 1913, when AT&T
started introducing benefits policies (company-paid pensions, sickness
and disability benefits, employee stock options, and an organization of
retired and long-service employees); from the 1920s on, the company had
seniority-based benefits and career ladders filled almost exclusively from
within (Schacht 1985: 35-36).
The Bell System recruited first level supervisors either from the rank
and file or from the external labor market. By the 1950s, those hired
from the outside were usually college-educated; and until the 1960s or
so, they were often placed in nonmanagement jobs for a year to learn
the business. First level supervisors received considerable management
training, primarily designed to separate managers from workers; and this
was particularly true for workers promoted from within, who were en-
couraged to break all social ties with former coworkers. The advantage
of promoting from within is that as former workers, supervisors had an
intimate knowledge of the technology and job requirements.
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The six levels of management above first level were filled exclusively
from within. Informal sponsorship was extremely important for ensuring
upward mobility; many also used the company's generous tuition-aid
program to complete college courses and qualify for middle level posi-
tions. Bell companies encouraged college-educated hires to climb to
higher levels of management, and they selected an elite group to be "fast-
tracked" and groomed for top management. In a longitudinal study of
managers at AT&T from 1956 to 1976, Ann Howard and Douglas Bray
found that the modal level of achievement for non-college-educated
managers was a level two management position, while that of college-
educated managers was level three; while 5 to 10 percent of non-college-
educated workers received promotions annually, 15 to 25 percent of
college-educated managers did so (Howard and Bray 1988: 128-29).
In summary, the system clearly created middle-class jobs and manage-
ment opportunities that otherwise would not have been available for a
population dispersed in small towns, cities, and rural areas across the
country. The AT&T internal labor market created a system of lifetime
employment security unlike that provided by other large corporations
because AT&T was guaranteed a rate of return by regulators and did not
face business cycle fluctuations.
The Changing Nature of Jobs: Pre- and Post-Divestiture
If we consider the two competing approaches to work reform that have
dominated post-divestiture efforts in the Bell System companies-job en-
hancement versus consolidation through technology and reengineering-
the first approach is a break from the past, while the second represents a
continuation. Moreover, while companies have undertaken job enhance-
ment experiments in most occupations~ they have occurred in "pockets"
and affected only a'minority of workers. New technologies and reengin-
eering, by contrast, have affected the entire workforce in particular occu-
pations, and therefore, have been more widely felt.
Job enhancement strategies since the 1980s are of four types: (a) those
that involve workers in "off-line" problem-solving groups (Quality of
Worklife committees, labor-management committees, quality improve-
ment teams); (b) those that absorb supervisory tasks (task assignments,
scheduling, monitoring, reporting), such as self-managed teams; (c) those
that broaden jobs (job rotation, multitasking, job enlargement); and (d)
those that deepen jobs (multiskilling, added quality control, and problem
solving). By far the most common efforts have been of the first two varie-
ties-both of which are directed at the problem of bureaucracy rather
than, for example, the excesses of Taylorism. Early experiments in off-
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line groups focused on changing the style of management from a top-
down military style to a more participative one. Later experiments in
self-managed teams push this logic further, allowing workers to absorb
supervisory tasks and firms to cut their indirect labor costs substantially.
Workers and unions have supported self-managed teams as a way of re-
ducing the excesses of heavy supervision, even though the teams must
often absorb more work without additional time allocated to do it.
In contrast to these experiments which increase worker discretion,
firms have expanded the labor-displacing technologies and the logic of
mass production into new areas. In contrast to job redesign theories that
emphasize the benefits of breadth and multiskilling, Bell companies have
continued the pre-divestiture strategy of narrowing jobs and applying
technologies that reduce the content of labor. In operator services, new
software technologies or "expert systems" have accelerated labor-dis-
placement and job fragmentation. In customer services, as a direct result
of deregulation, companies have created detailed divisions of labor to
separate out the sales function from other service functions; they have
also introduced automatic call distribution and expert systems to pace
work. Network digitalization has both decreased the demand for and
changed the skill content of some network craft jobs; and new handheld
computers represent the first introductlon of electronic monitoring into
outside crafts. The following section reviews these changes.
Network Crafts
As indicated above, by 1980, AT&T had created highly functionally-
specialized occupations in network, but the jobs themselves remained
craft-like. The jobs required electromechanical skills and the completion
of a whole task; geographic dispersion reinforced autonomy. AT&T tried
to compensate for its inability to control outside crafts by a management
strategy of heavy supervision and individual responsibility for detailed
quantitative performance measures (tasks or jobs per day). Job discipline
based on these measures was an ongoing source of labor-management
conflict.
It was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that new technologies-
particularly the digitalization of the network-began to reduce employ-
ment levels and change the skill content of network craft jobs.5 The
demand for skill has shifted from electromechanical to computer-based
5. AT&T has been four to five years ahead of the RBOCs in introducing these technolo-
gies. It introduced the first electronic switches that switched analog transmissions in the
late 1960s. It introduced the first fully digital switches in 1983.
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skills; the overall demand for labor decreased because systems needed
less maintenance. This change was particularly significant because it rep-
resents the first time in the network's history that increases in productiv-
ity were not accompanied by increases in employment; instead, the
relationship has reversed.
In the central offices, for example, switching technicians in the past
had hand-wired and manually repaired the relays and switches. Failures
were electrical and mechanical in nature. With electronic switches, by
contrast, switching technicians use computers to test switches via remote
work stations and write up orders for other technicians in the central
offices to carry out. More recently, new advances in software program-
ming make digital switches both self-diagnosing and "self-healing," fur-
ther reducing the demand for traditional electromechanical skills of craft
workers. A similar trend has occurred with the digitalization of PBX and
other customer premise equipment, which may now be remotely tested
and repaired.
The net effect of these changes on the demand for skill is mixed. On the
one hand, some of the repair work formerly done by top craft workers is
now done by clerks monitoring computers. For example, companies have
created computer-based inventories of network specifications-
information that used to be contained in blueprints. Engineering assis-
tants who created blueprints of high-level circuit order layout designs
have been replaced by clerks who do the same work at computers at
roughly 60 percent of the craft pay. Similarly, historically "testmen"
would manually test the line to identify the source of faulty transmission.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Bell System replaced testmen with
"maintenance administrators," clerks who use computer systems to iden-
tify the problem. On the other hand, while the change eliminated a top
craft job, clerks learned new software skills and were upgraded to a job
at 80 percent of testmen's wages. In addition, companies have created a
relatively small number of systems analyst and computer programming
jobs.
The introduction of fiber optic cable in the short run has increased the
demand for construction crews to replace copper wire, but in the long
run reduces the demand for cable splicers because it is relatively mainte-
nance-free. While AT&T and the RBOCs have substantially replaced
their trunk lines and feeder cables with fiber, the "last mile" (the 90 per-
cent of the network connecting the distribution cables in streets to the
customer premise) continues to be copper.
Other changes in network crafts are the introduction of handheld com-
puters which allow workers to input work reports as they finish them, a
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system which workers complain allows the company to monitor them
electronically for the first time. Another dimension of change concerns
the attempt of companies to turn network craft workers into a supple-
mentary sales force. In Total Quality training, network craft workers are
encouraged to use every opportunity to "meet customers needs," or sell.
Craft workers have tended to resist this change, and its diffusion is rela-
tively minimal because network craft workers consider sales to be de-
meaning, unskilled work.
AT&T and the regional Bell companies have also experimented with
self-managed teams in network crafts, and generally find that workers
successfully make the transition because they already have considerable
autonomy and discretion. Self-management, according to some, formal-
izes preexisting informal arrangements. This is particularly true in rural
areas, where large distances made heavy supervision infeasible, and
workers retained not only greater autonomy but more varied skills. The
evidence from interviews with teams, however, shows that the shift to
formal self-managed teams changes the responsibilities of even the more
autonomous rural workers, who absorb both the internal administrative
duties of supervisors and the external duties of interacting with custom-
ers as well as other activities to get the job done. This includes ordering
supplies, bringing in jobs, negotiating with parties over turf responsibili-
ties, answering customer complaints, and working with engineers in the
pre-survey stage. Craft workers now assume these responsibilities. In the
language of quality consultants, craft workers interaction with both in-
ternal and external customers has grown.
Survey evidence supports these qualitative reports. A comparison of
matched pairs of self-managed and traditionally supervised work groups
in network crafts found that they differ significantly along a series of
dimensions. Workers in the self-managed groups consistently showed
higher levels of autonomy in their control over work assignments, tools,
and pace of work; scheduling; and quality and safety inspections. They
also show significantly higher levels of internal group learning and prob-
lem solving as well as more frequent cross-functional problem solving
with managers and professionals outside of the group. While workers
report consistently higher levels of job satisfaction and work group qual-
ity, they absorb the work previously done by supervisors in 25 to 30
percent less time, leading to dramatic savings in indirect labor costs for
companies. The result is that this innovation has the support of the union
and top management alike because it provides mutual gains-more re-
warding jobs for workers, workforce reductions among managers rather
than workers, and cost savings for management. As discussed in greater
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detail below, supervisors and middle managers suffer job loss under this
model, but those who remain often experience job enhancement because
they are relieved of mundane reporting and monitoring responsibilities
(Batt 1995).
Customer Service
Customer service representatives (CSRs) are frontline employees who
deal directly with customers over a range of issues) including sales, ser-
vice orders) questions on service or billing) and collections on overdue
accounts. Historically, telephone companies had "universal" service rep-
resentatives who handled all customer requests and problems. Over the
past decade, the companies and unions have debated the content of the
service representative job, and the future is still uncertain. As a direct
response to deregulation and the desire to increase revenues, Bell operat-
ing companies subdivided the service representative job into sales (CSRs)
on the one hand, and services (collections representatives or credit con-
sultants) on the other. The logic of the split job titles was to separate
out interactions with customers that are "positive" from those that are
"negative," thereby allowing CSRs to sell more. The split title allows
companies to pay a lower hourly rate to the collections representatives
(about 90 percent of what CSRs receive). On the billing side, some com-
panies have further divided the job into those who handle active bills
versus past-due bills. '
According to workers, the split job functions confuse customers who
want to get all of their business done with one call. It also has negative
cost implications because CSRs feel pressured to meet their sales quotas
and may sell to people who are poor credit risks. Collections representa-
tives then find themselves dealing with repeat offenders.6
Companies have also divided service representative jobs by market seg-
ment-between those handling residential customers, small business, and
large business accounts. While the first two job categories are narrower
and involve only phone sales, account executives for large business pro-
vide one-stop-shopping for their clients. According to customer service
workers, AT&T has developed an automated system that distributes in-
coming customer calls by their call volume, with high-end users for-
warded to an account executive and mid-level users to a service
representative, and low-end users co a recording and voice mail.
6. US West, for example, found that uncollectible payments, or net bad debt, had tripled
in the five years after it split the titles, and this led them to create yet another job classifica-
tion of customer credit approval (U.S. Congress 1993: 413).
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In addition to the split titles in customer services, telephone companies
have added telemarketing departments which handle only high-volume
outgoing sales solicitation, usually follow-up calls to ad campaigns. Tra-
ditionally, telephone sales occurred primarily through incoming cus-
tomer calls, handled by universal service representatives. To maximize
sales, companies have dramatically increased their marketing budgets.
Telemarketing jobs usually rely on a secondary, or low wage, high turn-
over workforce often under lease or subcontracting arrangements. The
jobs resemble those of operators in terms of their low cycle time and
repetitiveness, and use of expert computer systems to control the timing
and script of calls.7
The job of CSR has also become more pressured, more specialized, and
increasingly complex as telephone companies have developed differenti-
ated products-a variety of enhanced services-to add value in saturated
telephone markets. Most industry practitioners agree that service repre-
sentatives have the most stressful jobs in the industry. Companies mea-
sure CSR performance by sales volume and/or achievement of sales
quotas. Top sellers receive awards of cash or prizes. In many cases, com-
panies also discipline CSRs who fail to meet adherence standards-
schedules of 15 minute increments that indicate when CSRs are to be
taking calls, on rest break, or at lunch.
To increase efficiency, companies have adopted new policies, both to
reduce the amount of time that service representatives take between calls
and to spread the distribution of calls more evenly. First, companies have
introduced "automated call distribution" systems that pace work as well
as expert systems that instantly supply customer background informa-
tion, help identify selling opportunities, and electronically monitor the
service representative. Second, they have shifted call distribution from a
local level to a state level or beyond. While in the past, customers received
specialized service from a local service representative whom they could
come to know personally, automatic distribution systems now route calls
to service representatives in consolidated offices around a state or region.
For CSRs, this means they have a constant call-load, rather than a pace
of work that varies over the course of a day. A third strategy has been to
distribute calls over a longer period of the day-to establish 24-hour ser-
vice with workers divided into three shifts for the first time.
7. Recently, at least two companies-US West and BellSouth-decided that they could
improve quality by bringing telemarketing work in-house, and negotiated with their unions
to "accrete" the telemarketing workers to the bargaining unit. In these companies, telemar-
keting jobs are now full-time with benefits.
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At the same time that companies have introduced new systems that
reduce CSRs' control over work, they have also tried experiments in "em-
powerment," in self-managed teams, and in job redesign to return to
the "universal" approach. An example of the "empowerment" approach
comes from total quality concepts initiated in several companies to give
service representatives greater discretion to make nonroutine billing ad-
justments, a decision formerly made by supervisors.
In experiments with self-managed teams, service representatives ab-
sorb both the administrative tasks for the work group and the job of
interfacing with "subject matter experts" in other departments to find
out answers to nonroutine questions or problems that arise. This change
requires managerial staff in other departments to give to workers the
respect and credibility normally reserved for professional and managerial
employees. Team members report that they enjoy the independence, the
greater respect from managers, and the internal group cooperation that
comes from working as a team. Group members also share knowledge
in areas such as improving sales revenues, solving complicated billing
problems, or handling difficult customers.
Quantitative analysis of survey and objective productivity data indi-
cates that team membership significantly improves workers' job satisfac-
tion as well as sales revenues. Multivariate analysis of sales data shows
that members of self-managed teams achieve 17 percent higher monthly
sales revenues, after controlling for variation in technology, markets,
human resource practices, and demographic characteristics of workers
(Batt 1995). As in the network teams described above, use of teams in
customer services appears to produce mutual gains for workers and
unions as well as management.
These findings are particularly surprising because self-managed teams
are more difficult to establish in office settings. As already noted, auto-
matic call distributors set the pace of work. Software technology allows
companies to set call-loads at the state level or larger geographic region
so that not even lower or middle level managers have discretion over
scheduling and assignments. To give these workers the time away from
the board needed to absorb supervisory tasks, supervisors may have to
reduce the workload or call-load of the teams; many supervisors are un-
able or unwilling to do this either because they don't have discretion
over call-loads, because workloads are already too heavy as a result of
downsizing, or because giving "special treatment" to self-managed
groups creates resentment from other workers.
In addition to self-managed teams, a number of companies have been
rethinking the specialized job titles in customer services; and some have
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made the decision to return to the concept of "universal service represen-
tative" or "one-stop shopping." The push for change has come largely
from workers who seek relief from monotonous jobs. The most extensive
experiment was a two-year joint labor-management job redesign effort
for 5,000 service workers at US West in 1992 and 1993. The job rede-
sign, piloted in Phoenix, put an end to sales quotas. It envisioned a center
for customer service that reintegrated sales, credit verification, billing,
and collections, and ultimately, dispatch and repair services as well. Em-
ployees would be cross-trained in different functions and work as a team,
rotating jobs and gaining some choice in task-assignments. Additionally,
rather than using an automatic call distributor, the design called for an
"interactive work distributor" which would allow service representatives
to log on and choose the types of calls they would receive during a given
work period. The job redesign, however, was never implemented because
the company halted implementation in 1993 when it announced a com-
pany-wide consolidation (U.S. Congress 1993). Other companies, such
as AT&T, have piloted experiments in broader job design for service con-
sultants serving small business clients; but by 1996, widescale implemen-
tation had not occurred.
Operators
Historically, the Traffic Department consisted of hundreds of thou-
sands of operators tied to switchboards with supervisors or "service as-
sistants" walking around behind them: operators were heavily
monitored, both physically and electronically. They were the "human
switch," manually making the connections between lines that would later
be made by electromechanical switching systems, and currently, digital
switching systems. The jobs were also complex and multiskilled-both
physically and mentally demanding, requiring intense concentration to
respond to signal lights, converse with customers and other operators,
plug in cords and time and record long distance calls (Schacht 1985:
31-32). Operator jobs are the female counterpart to auto assembly line
work, providing low discretion and high demands, an archetype of high
stress work.
Major technological displacement of operators occurred in the 1920s
and 1930s as dial tone (mechanical switching) made it possible for cus-
tomers to dial their own local calls, and again in the 195 Os, when
switches made it possible to direct dial long distance calls.8 Digital sys-
8. One switchboard operator did the work of six manual operators, leading to the
displacement of some 50,000 operators in the 1930s (Danielian 1939: 210-12).
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terns further eliminated operator work by letting customers use credit
cards to direct dial. The new technologies also reduced the variety in
operator jobs: eliminating the physical side of the job, reducing the types
of calls, and eliminating the diagnostic work of identifying faulty tele-
phone circuits (Kohl 1993:104). Companies first introduced automatic
call distribution systems in operator services to increase the pace of work.
In the post-divestiture period, several changes have continued to dis-
place and fragment operator jobs. First, using customer systems with en-
larged computing power, "automated response systems" split long
distance call-handling between two operators: the first punches in the
numbers and goes on to another call while the computer makes the con-
nection. The second operator comes on the line to ask if the collect call
will be accepted. This "split" call-handling saves several seconds in an
operator's handling of each call, and saves companies millions of dollars
each year (Kohl 1993:105). These systems reduce call cycle time, increas-
ing the repetitiveness and tedium of jobs. By the mid-1990s, directory
assistance operators were handling approximately 1,000 calls per day.
Consistent with new technologies are new work procedures that limit
the time operators spend with customers. Companies restrict operators,
for example, from giving out more than two numbers at a time. Accord-
ing to one experienced operator, new work rules instruct operators to be
more forceful in turning back callers and telling them to dial direct or to
use a credit card.
Another change is the now widespread use of computer-generated
voice messages, primitive voice recognition systems or "robot opera-
tors," which instruct callers to enter a series of numbers in order to place
a call or obtain billing or other information. Another automated proce-
dure is automatic calls to customers to remind them their bill is overdue.
Companies continue to develop and test ever more sophisticated voice
recognition software designed to reduce the labor content of operator
services. This technology allows computers to recognize key words and
to handle a greater variety of calls (collect, person to person, third party
billing) as well as to recognize different languages.
In contrast to the thrust of new technologies and work methods which
reduce the discretion of operators, companies have also experimented
with self-managed teams or "team-centered management" in operator
services. AT&T's Eastern Region of Consumer Customer Services (for-
merly Operator Services) introduced self-managed teams in 1988, and
the program subsequently expanded throughout the region. "Teams" of
twelve to twenty-five operators would meet on a monthly basis to discuss
performance objectives, results, and appraisals. In addition, smaller
t
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teams of six to ten employees would absorb the administrative tasks pre-
viously handled by managers and take responsibility for problem solving
and conflict resolution. Multiple purposes of the effort include reducing
management ranks and increasing their span of control, improving em-
ployee morale and involvement in decision making, and improving labor-
management trust. The new system covered 5,000 employees, before it
began to unravel in 1994 as a result of a another round of downsizing in
operator services coupled with the departure of the top manager, Dana
Becker Dunn, who had spearheaded the team-based system.
Managers
In the pre-divestiture period, managerial jobs in the Bell System were
highly regimented and functionally specialized-resembling much more
the Taylorism of industrial labor markets (Doeringer and Piore 1971)
than the breadth commonly associated with managerial markets (Oster-
man 1988).9 Managers rose in functional silos through seven layers of
management leading up to officers in the Bell System; those groomed for
top management were rotated across departments. Observers described
the AT&T system as a military one: "A traffic manager in the smallest of
Bell offices reports to the traffic manager directly above him in the next
largest office area to district to regional to operating company and ulti-
mately to 195 Broadway [AT&T's 'Pentagon']-just as an Army G-1
officer has counterpart from battalion level all the way up to the Defense
Department" (Goulden 1968:17).
The primary role of supervisors and managers was to meet productiv-
ity goals. AT&T embraced the 1960s fad of management by objectives.
And because the Bell System measured the performance of managers as
the aggregate of the performance of workers under them, the system pro-
vided incentives for heavy monitoring of workers and enforcement of
work discipline. If top management demanded better numbers, middle
and lower managers felt squeezed, and in turn, pressured workers. Stan-
dard operating procedures set at the top, however, often made the jobs
of responsible managers more difficult: they had to act as if they were
following orders while working around them to get the job done. The
system of functionally-specific measures reinforced separation and "turf"
competition between managers in different departments. Maximizing ef-
ficiencies in one department, however, often undermined efficiencies in
another. Maximizing tasks per day, for example, creates incentives to
9. This section summarizes the more detailed analysis of changing managerial jobs and
careers found in Batt (1996).
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find quick fixes to problems, which may result in repeat repair calls for
repair technicians, or long-term network deterioration requiring replace-
ment.
In the post-divestiture period, changes in managerial jobs have drawn
on ideas of employee participation and total quality, beginning with
"participatory management" to change the military-style command-and-
control nature of managerial jobs. The changes for managers stressed
new behaviors rather than new skills in the narrower sense of the term.
Management training emphasized a "softer" approach of listening more
than dictating. Middle and lower level managers had to learn to discuss
ongoing problems with union leaders, rather than only in the context of
grievances. The use of self-managed teams, still in its infancy, is a logical
extension of this approach; and where teams have been introduced, they
particularly change the jobs of first-line supervisors, who become
"coaches." Coaches are supposed to "lead rather than command, inspire
rather than demand obedience," according to industry practitioners and
consultants.
The effects on first-line supervisors of the shift to teams appears to
be complex. One multivariate analysis of the determinants of the work
attitudes of supervisors found that supervising self-managed teams had a
significant negative effect on supervisors' job satisfaction, but a signifi-
cant positive effect on their organizational commitment. These findings
are consistent with qualitative evidence from the same study: supervisors
noted that the shift to self-managed teams was necessary for the company
to streamline management ranks and increase the span of control of su-
pervisors (from a traditional ratio of 1:6 to 1:20 or more) (Batt 1995). In
effect, while supervisors felt threatened by the changes, they signaled
their commitment to the company by supporting an innovation that they
viewed as necessary for competitiveness.
The response of supervisors also appears to be contingent upon how
management redesigns the job responsibilities of supervisors. As compa-
nies attempt to increase the span of control of supervisors, the super-
visors will simply experience greater workloads unless they are relieved
of some of their prior responsibilities. By shifting the more mundane re-
porting and monitoring responsibilities to workers while increasing the
coordinating and developmental functions of supervisors, their jobs may
actually be enhanced.
According to one company-sponsored survey of network supervisors,
two-thirds of the supervisors were dissatisfied with their traditional job
responsibilities; one-third said they would return to craft (nonmanage-
ment) jobs if given the opportunity. The company found that traditional
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supervisors spent 60 percent of their time doing administrative work and
less than 10 percent of their time in the field monitoring or training work-
ers. The company subsequently used the experience from self-managed
teams to develop a new supervisor job description. Under the piloted job
redesign, coaches spend fifty percent of their time in the field-a dramatic
improvement from the perspective of the supervisors who express dislike
for "paperwork."
For middle level managers responsible for local or district level opera-
tions (responsible for a county or portion of a city, the ~quivalent of a
plant manager in manufacturing), companies have also applied total
quality concepts to decentralize responsibility and create "ownership."
The idea is to create small business units in large organizations.
In one company, for example, to break from the past when local man-
agers had little discretion and reported through department hierarchies
to state operations managers, the company created cross-departmental
"district operations councils" for integrated problem solving at the local
level. The district councils, local geographic units established at divesti-
ture and made up of local managers from different departments, had
functioned in the 1980s primarily as vehicles for public relations, em-
ployee involvement in community affairs, and the telephone company's
interface with the regulatory environment. Local managers maintained
departmental turf and interacted little beyond monthly council meetings.
Under the total quality program, the new role for the district operations
councils was to improve service quality, maximize revenues, and control
costs. Legislative and regulatory duties became secondary; coordination
of community activities was discontinued. Councils took responsibility
for initiating quality action teams to solve particular problems or initiate
workplace innovations such as self-managed teams. Newly revised cus-
tomer service reports provided data at the local level, rather than at the
state level as had previously occurred.
Conceptually this reform represents a change not only from centralized
to decentralized, and functional to more collaborative ways of operating,
but from a focus on public service to individual customer sales, from
actions such as community service that present the collective face of the
company, to actions designed to maximize sales. For middle managers,
this requires a shift in skills: away from the regulatory environment and
toward business, marketing, and human resource management. More im-
portantly, it represents a break from the moral purpose of the organiza-
tion as put forth by Barnard (1938)-and many workers and managers
alike resent this change as a violation of their ethical standards. From the
viewpoint of the customer, the effects of this change are unclear. To the
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extent that employees focus on improving customer service, the public
indeed will benefit. To the extent that companies pressure employees to
meet demanding sales quotas, customers may be negatively effected.
They may face heavy-handed marketing, or as has occurred in at least
three states (Florida, Pennsylvania, and California), employees may feel
pressured to engage in questionable sales practices such as assuming lev-
els of enhanced services for customers without their full knowledge or
explicit agreement.
Finally, companies have initiated changes in human resource policies
that uniquely affect managers. Whereas workers are covered by collective
bargaining contracts and unions to date have successfully avoided major
restructuring of compensation systems or benefit plans (with the excep-
tion of co-payment plans in health care), companies have unilaterally
introduced changes in performance appraisals, compensation, and bene-
fit plans for managers.
A representative example comes from one regional Bell company that
has reclassified jobs and introduced new measurement and compensation
systems in order to increase competitive behavior. To match jobs more
closely with the external market, managerial job classifications dropped
from 3,600 to 2,000, largely by eliminating departmental distinctions
and creating short descriptions of broad responsibilities. The new job
classifications drive changes in performance measurement and compensa-
tion, and link pay scales more closely to the external market. A forced
distribution system to promote pay-for-performance has replaced across-
the-board pay raises. Under the new system, managers receive between
80 percent and 120 percent of their grade, but a forced distribution
means that superiors must differentiate more between high and low per-
formers among their subordinates. An additional 10 percent of salary is
at risk (an innovation since divestiture), with group payouts dependent
upon firm performance. Additionally, the company has altered its pro-
motion policies to allow external recruitment to "fill skill gaps." The
question for current managers is what constitute skill gaps and to what
extent they will be allowed to train and skill up in new areas before
external recruits are added.
Post-Divestiture Internal Labor Markets
The most significant change for workers and managers alike under the
new internal labor market rules is the break in the historic commitment
to long-term employment contracts. Companies have continued with rel-
atively high wages and benefits, education and training opportunities re-
main above average, and companies have increased opportunities for
--'8
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retraining in some cases.Use of two-tier wage structures or part-time and
contingent workers remains relatively marginal; however, subcontracting
has expanded. The commitment to downsize has at least three significant
effects. First, in the absence of successful reengineering projects, employ-
ees have simply absorbed the work that was previously done by a larger
number of people. One survey of employees at a regional Bell company
found that 69 percent of workers and 93 percent of managers said their
workload had increased over the last two years. Forty-eight percent of
workers and 60 percent of managers said they were always or quite fre-
quently understaffed. Sixty-three percent of all managers (68 % of net-
work and 52% of customer services) said they worked ten hours or more
each day, and over 60 percent said they had more overtime or take-home
work than they wanted. For managers, these higher workloads are re-
flected in increased spans of control. Seventy-two percent of all managers
say that their span of control has increased, with a significantly greater
percentage (82%) in customer services than in network (67%). Almost
40 percent of those with larger spans of control now supervise three to
five additional workers; another 37 percent manage between six and fif-
teen additional workers (Batt 1995; Batt 1996).
Downsizing has also reduced overall mobility throughout the work-
force. In most cases, job ladders created under the old Bell System con-
tinue in place; but mobility has virtually ceased. In the same survey, 83
percent of workers and 89 percent of managers indicated that opportuni-
ties for promotion had declined; 72 percent of workers and 78 percent
of managers said opportunities for lateral transfer had declined.1° Only
5 percent of managers at the company were promoted to higher pay
grades in 1990, a fraction of what existed during the 1950s through
1970s when the Howard and Bray study (1988) was conducted. More-
over, approximately the same number of managers received promotions
in 1990 as in 1991 through 1993. A large minority of managers (38%)
said they had had to relocate in the. past three years as a result of organi-
zational restructuring (Batt 1995; Batt 1996).
Third, the ongoing downsizing undermines morale. The upheaval and
dislocation is reflected in employee dissatisfaction over particular aspects
10. Interviews with managers indicate that downsizing also reduces requests for lateral
transfers: managers don't want to risk losing their "sponsorship" and joining a new depart-
ment where they will be the new person, a relative unknown to a new supervisor who will
evaluate them. Interviewees also related stories of managers reluctant to take advantage of
opportunities for mid-career educational programs or international experience for fear that
("out of sight, out of mind") their departments would have learned that they were dispens-
able.
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of their jobs that have been most affected and of corporate leadership
more generally. Whereas Keefe's study found widespread demoralization
at AT&T as we discussed in the second section above, Batt's study finds
growing discontent at an RBOC. The RBOC study found that 86 per-
cent of workers and 92 percent of managers said job security had de-
creased in the last two years. Whereas over two-thirds of workers were
satisfied with their jobs, benefits, and pay, only 14 percent were satisfied
with their opportunities for promotion and 27 percent were satisfied with
their job security. The pattern was similar among managers: whereas 70
percent or more were satisfied with their jobs, pay, and benefits, less than
20 percent were satisfied with their employment security or opportunities
for advancement. In sum, employees continue to like the work they do
and the skills they use and have very low absentee rates. Most score high
on commitment measures such as their willingness to work harder for
the company, their pride in working for the company, and the loyalty
they feel. But they are critical of top management's commitment to them:
to employment security and advancement, to providing adequate re-
sources for getting the job done, and to taking into consideration the
interests of employees when making technological and organizational de-
cisions (Batt 1996).
Conclusions
The ultimate outcome of industrial restructuring in U.S. telecommuni-
cations is still uncertain and likely to remain so for several years. Several
patterns, however, emerge from our analysis. First, at the level of the
industry, the centralizing thrust of network technologies compete with
decentralizing market strategies. Changes in productivity growth reflect
this mismatch. The rate of productivity growth has declined in the 1980s
because of the overcapacity generated by multiple players. More signifi-
cantly, the historic positive relationship between productivity growth and
employment growth has reversed itself in this decade. The extensive ac-
tivity of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and deal-making has netted
few new permanent or productive alliances.
At the firm level, companies have created cross-functional business
units that do away with the worst information problems associated with
functional silos. This restructuring enhances the managerial jobs that re-
main, but downsizing increases workloads and spans of control. While
these reforms reduce bureaucracy, they do not attack Taylorism or func-
tional specialization at the nonmanagement level, which has, in fact, ac-
celerated. Pockets of innovative experiments in self-management or
multi skilled teams have been overshadowed by cost-cutting benefits asso-
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ciated with reengineering and the application of new software technolo-
gies such as automated call distribution systems for service workers.
Companies in this sense have continued to implement labor-displacing
and deskilling technologies that are much more consistent with pre-
divestiture past practices than not. As a result, the tensions, disagree-
ments, and lack of trust between labor and management have increased
in an industry historically known for cooperation between the parties.
Ironically, this shift is occurring in a period in which most management
and industrial relations scholars alike call for reduced adversarialism if
U.S. firms are to be globally competitive. While it is surprising that cor-
porate restructuring to date has not produced more outright conflict, it
appears that unions have accepted at least some labor displacement as
an inevitable outcome of deregulation and have made the strategic deci-
sion to negotiate generous severance packages, retirement buyouts, and
retraining-replacement programs as the best alternative for members'
welfare. What remains unclear is whether companies can continue to pay
the generous settlements that have bought labor peace and whether con-
tinued downsizing will erode the embedded skill base that historically
provided high productivity growth for these companies.
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